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ARTICLES
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT UNDER
THE MICROSCOPE
By Mike Koehler*
For most of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’s history, key decisions
concerning its scope and enforcement were made behind closed doors
around conference room tables in Washington, D.C. The FCPA took on a
life of its own and, in many instances, the statute came to mean whatever
the DOJ or SEC could get putative corporate FCPA defendants (mindful of
the consequences of actual prosecuted charges) to agree to behind those
closed doors. However, as the enforcement agencies continued to push the
envelope on enforcement theories and practices, and as the DOJ brought
more individual FCPA enforcement actions, including through
manufactured sting operations, business entities and individuals alike
began to openly fight back. While many FCPA enforcement decisions and
procedures remain opaque, 2011 witnessed the most intense year of public
scrutiny in the FCPA’s history. This Article (i) provides an overview of
2011 FCPA enforcement and discusses certain problematic enforcement
trends, and (ii) highlights how in 2011 the FCPA was subjected to the most
meaningful public scrutiny in its history. FCPA enforcement trends and
scrutiny demonstrate that as the FCPA nears its thirty-fifth year, basic
legal and policy questions remain as to the purpose, scope, and
effectiveness of the FCPA.
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INTRODUCTION
For most of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’s (“FCPA”) history,
key decisions concerning its scope and enforcement were made behind
closed doors around conference room tables in Washington, D.C. The
FCPA took on a life of its own and, in many instances, the statute came to
mean whatever the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) or the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) could get putative corporate FCPA
defendants (mindful of the consequences of actual prosecuted charges) to
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agree to behind those closed doors.1 However, as the enforcement agencies
continued to push the envelope on enforcement theories and practices, and
as the DOJ brought more individual FCPA enforcement actions, including
through manufactured sting operations, business entities and individuals
began to openly fight back. While many FCPA enforcement decisions and
procedures remain opaque, 2011 witnessed the most intense year of public
scrutiny in the FCPA’s history.
Part I of this Article contains an overview of 2011 FCPA enforcement
and highlights four enforcement trends: (i) the magnitude and quantity of
enforcement actions against foreign companies and foreign nationals and
how this contributes to a U.S. foreign bribery surplus; (ii) reliance on
corporate voluntary disclosures in bringing enforcement actions and how
this contributes to a thriving and growing FCPA industry; (iii) extensive
use of alternative resolution vehicles in resolving enforcement actions and
how this contributes to both under-prosecution of egregious instances of
corporate bribery and over-prosecution of business conduct; and (iv) the
lack of individual prosecutions in most corporate FCPA enforcement
actions and how this reflects on the quality of the related corporate
enforcement action.
Part II of this Article highlights that in 2011, the FCPA was subjected
to the most meaningful public scrutiny in its history. This scrutiny of the
FCPA and FCPA enforcement came from multiple directions: Congress,
the judiciary, and others such as academics, the press, and public interest
groups. The FCPA is a fundamentally sound statute that was passed by
Congress in 1977 to prohibit certain payments to a narrow category of
recipients comprised of traditional foreign government officials performing
official or public functions. However, this scrutiny demonstrates that as the
FCPA nears its thirty-fifth year, basic legal and policy questions remain as
to the purpose, scope, and effectiveness of the FCPA and FCPA
* Assistant Professor, Southern Illinois University School of Law. Professor Koehler’s
FCPA expertise and views are informed by a decade of legal practice experience at a
leading international law firm. The issues covered in this Article, current as of January 16,
2012, assume the reader has sufficient knowledge and understanding of the FCPA as well as
FCPA enforcement (including the role of the DOJ and SEC in enforcing the FCPA and the
resolution vehicles typically used to resolve FCPA inquiries). Interested readers can learn
more about these topics, and others, by reading Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA
Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907 (2010). The author’s FCPA Professor website
(http://www.fcpaprofessor.com) is also a useful resource for FCPA developments and
analysis. See Mike Koehler, FCPA 101, FCPA PROFESSOR, http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/f
cpa-101 (last visited Dec. 1, 2012) (answering frequently asked questions regarding the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act).
1. See generally Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L
L. 907 (2010) [hereinafter Façade] (discussing the implications of this enforcement
dynamic).
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enforcement.
I.

FCPA ENFORCEMENT OVERVIEW—2011

FCPA enforcement in 2011 was mild compared to 2010, when the
DOJ and SEC combined collected approximately $1.8 billion in corporate
fines, penalties, and disgorgement in FCPA or FCPA-related enforcement
actions.2 As demonstrated in the chart below, in eleven corporate FCPA
enforcement actions in 2011, the DOJ collected approximately $355
million in criminal fines. Including the approximately $149 million
forfeiture Jeffrey Tesler (the U.K. agent at the center of the Bonny Island,
Nigeria bribery scheme) agreed to in his 2011 plea agreement,3 the DOJ’s
FCPA enforcement program in 2011 collected approximately $504 million.

Table I - 2011 DOJ Corporate FCPA Enforcement Actions
Company

Fine

Resolution Vehicle

Maxwell Technologies4

$8 million

DPA

Tyson Foods5

$4 million

DPA

2. See Mike Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Enters a New Era, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 99, 101-04 (2011) (detailing $1.27 billion in DOJ
corporate FCPA and FCPA-related enforcement actions in 2010 and $530 million in SEC
corporate FCPA enforcement actions in 2010).
3. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, UK Solicitor Pleads Guilty for Role in Bribing
Nigerian Government Officials as Part of KBR Joint Venture Scheme (Mar. 11, 2011), http:/
/www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/March/11-crm-313.html. As noted in the DOJ’s release,
Tesler was a former consultant to Kellogg, Brown & Root, Inc. (“KBR”) and its joint
venture partners in connection with certain engineering, procurement and construction
contracts to build liquefied natural gas facilities on Bonny Island, Nigeria. Id. KBR, the
other joint venture partners, and certain other companies and individuals previously resolved
FCPA (or related) enforcement actions based on the same Bonny Island conduct. Mike
Koehler, Bonny Island Bribery Statistics, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.fcp
aprofessor.com/bonny-island-bribery-statistics. For instance, the JGC of Japan enforcement
action from 2011 (the largest in terms of DOJ fine amounts from 2011) was based on Bonny
Island conduct. Id.
4. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Maxwell Technologies Inc. Resolves Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay $8 Million Criminal Penalty (Jan. 31,
2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/January/11-crm-129.html.
5. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Tyson Foods Inc. Agrees to Pay $4 Million
Criminal Penalty to Resolve Foreign Bribery Allegations (Feb. 10, 2011), http://www.justic
e.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-crm-171.html.
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JGC of Japan6
(Japanese Company)

$218.8 million

DPA

Comverse Technology7

$1.2 million

NPA

Johnson & Johnson8

$21.4 million

DPA

Tenaris9
(Luxembourg Company)
Cinergy
Telecommunications10
Armor Holdings11

$3.5 million

NPA

N/A

N/A

$10.2 million

NPA

Bridgestone12
(Japanese Company)

$22 million13

Plea

Aon Corp.14

$1.8 million

NPA

6. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, JGC Corporation Resolves Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay a $218.8 Million Criminal Penalty (Apr. 6,
2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/April/11-crm-431.html.
7. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Comverse Technology Inc. Agrees to Pay
$1.2 Million Penalty to Resolve Violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Apr. 7,
2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/April/11-crm-438.html.
8. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Johnson & Johnson Agrees to Pay $21.4
Million Criminal Penalty to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Oil for Food
Investigations (Apr. 8, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/April/11-crm-446.html.
9. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Tenaris S.A. Agrees to Pay $3.5 Million
Criminal Penalty to Resolve Violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (May 17,
2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/May/11-crm-629.html.
10. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Florida Telecommunications Company, Two
Executives, an Intermediary, and Two Former Haitian Government Officials Indicted for
Their Alleged Participation in Foreign Bribery Scheme (July 13, 2011),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/July/11-crm-910.html. Unlike the vast majority of
business organizations subject to FCPA scrutiny, Cinergy Telecommunications was
criminally indicted and the charges against it remain pending. Id.
11. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Armor Holdings Agrees to Pay $10.2 Million
Criminal Penalty to Resolve Violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (July 13,
2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/July/11-crm-911.html.
12. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bridgestone Corporation Agrees to Plead
Guilty to Participating in Conspiracies to Rig Bids and Bribe Foreign Government Officials
(Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/September/11-crm-1193.html.
13. Based on DOJ filings, it appears that approximately eighty percent of the $28
million fine (for both FCPA violations and antitrust violations) was based on FCPA
conduct. Mike Koehler, Bridgestone Corporation Resolves FCPA (and Antitrust)
Enforcement Action, FCPA PROFESSOR (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/cate
gory/bridgestone-corporation.
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Magyar Telekom /
Deutsche Telekom15
(Hungarian Company /
German Company)

$59.6 million;
4.4 million

TOTAL

$355 million

[Vol. 15:1

DPA; NPA

In 2011, the SEC brought thirteen corporate FCPA enforcement
actions and collected approximately $148 million in civil penalties,
disgorgement, and prejudgment interest.
Table II - 2011 SEC Corporate FCPA Enforcement Actions
Company

Settlement Amount

Maxwell Technologies16

$6.3 million

Tyson Foods17

$1.2 million

IBM Corp.18

$10 million

Ball Corp.19

$300,000

Tenaris20

$5.4 million

14. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Aon Corporation Agrees to Pay a $1.76
Million Criminal Penalty to Resolve Violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Dec.
20, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/December/11-crm-1678.html.
15. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Magyar Telekom and Deutsche Telekom
Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agree to Pay Nearly $64 Million
in Combined Criminal Penalties (Dec. 29, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/Dece
mber/11-crm-1714.html.
16. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Maxwell Technologies
for Long-Running Bribery Scheme in China (Jan. 31, 2011), available at http://www.sec.go
v/news/press/2011/2011-31.htm.
17. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Tyson Foods With FCPA
Violations (Feb. 10, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-42.htm.
18. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, IBM to Pay $10 Million in Settled
FCPA Enforcement Action (Mar. 18, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/l
r21889.htm.
19. Ball Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 64123, 2011 WL 1099562 (ALJ Mar. 24,
2011) (cease-and-desist order), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2011/3464123.pdf.
20. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Tenaris to Pay $5.4 Million in SEC’s
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(Luxembourg Company)
Rockwell Automation21

$2.7 million

Johnson & Johnson22

$48.6 million

Comverse Technologies23

$1.6 million

Armor Holdings24

$5.7 million

Diageo25
(United Kingdom Company)

$16.4 million

Watts Water Technologies26

$3.8 million

Aon Corp.27

$14.5 million

Magyar Telekom / Deutsche
Telekom28
(Hungarian Company / German
Company)

$31.2 million

First-Ever Deferred Prosecution Agreement (May 17, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press
/2011/2011-112.htm.
21. Rockwell Automation Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 64380, 2011 WL 1663602
(ALJ
May
3,
2011)
(cease-and-desist
order),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2011/34-64380.pdf.
22. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges J&J with Foreign Bribery
(April 7, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-87.htm.
23. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Files Settled FCPA Case Against
Comverse (Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr21920.htm.
24. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Armor Holdings, Inc.
with FCPA Violations in Connection with Sales to the United Nations (July 13, 2011), http:/
/www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-146.htm.
25. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Liquor Giant Diageo
with FCPA Violations (July 27, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-158.htm.
26. Watts Water Techs., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 65555, 2011 WL 4860051
(ALJ Oct. 13, 2011) (cease-and-desist order), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/ad
min/2011/34-65555.pdf.
27. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Files Settled FCPA Charges
Against Aon Corporation (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr2
2203.htm.
28. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Magyar Telekom and
Former Executives with Bribing Officials in Macedonia and Montenegro (Dec. 29, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-279.htm.
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$148 million

Combined DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement in 2011 collected
approximately $652 million.29
Although it is interesting to compare year-to-year enforcement
statistics, such a comparison is of marginal value as many non-substantive
factors can influence the timing of an FCPA enforcement action.30 What is
valuable to observe and analyze are FCPA enforcement trends and 2011
witnessed a continuation of several significant trends, including four
discussed below.

29. This figure includes the $149 million Jeffrey Tesler enforcement action. As
evident from the DOJ and SEC charts above, there is substantial overlap between the DOJ
and SEC’s FCPA enforcement programs. FCPA enforcement actions typically involve
related and coordinated enforcement actions by the DOJ for criminal FCPA violations
(whether anti-bribery violations or books and records and internal control violations) and the
SEC for civil FCPA violations (whether anti-bribery violations or books and records and
internal control violations). Enforcement actions from 2011 that fit this pattern include:
Maxwell Technologies, Tyson Foods, Comverse, Johnson & Johnson, Tenaris, Armor
Holdings, Aon, and Magyar Telekom/Deutsche Telekom. The overlap, however, between
the DOJ and SEC’s FCPA enforcement programs is not complete. As a general matter, the
SEC has jurisdiction only over “issuers” (both domestic and foreign companies with shares
registered on a U.S. exchange and domestic and foreign companies otherwise required to
make filings with the SEC). In other words, the SEC generally does not have jurisdiction
over private companies. Thus, certain FCPA enforcement actions from 2010, such as
Bridgestone, Cinergy Telecommunications and JGC of Japan, did not have an SEC
component. As a general matter, the DOJ has jurisdiction over “issuers,” “domestic
concerns,” (any business entity with a principal place of business in the U.S. or organized
under U.S. law), and non-U.S. companies and persons to the extent a bribery scheme
involve conduct “while in the territory of the U.S.” Because the DOJ must satisfy a higher
burden of proof in a criminal prosecution, and given the DOJ’s prosecutorial discretion,
certain FCPA enforcement actions in 2011 such as those involving Watts Water
Technologies, Diageo, Rockwell Automation, Ball Corporation, and IBM, only included an
SEC component. As to the DOJ’s discretion, the DOJ has stated that it has declined
prosecutions when, among other things, a single employee—and no other employee—was
involved in the improper payments at issue, and the improper payments at issue involved
minimal funds compared to the overall business revenues. See Mike Koehler, DOJ Declines
To Get Specific In Declination Responses, FCPA PROFESSOR (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.fc
paprofessor.com/doj-declines-to-get-specific-in-declination-responses
(analyzing
DOJ
rationale for declining to bring an enforcement action).
30. Because FCPA enforcement actions that involve both a DOJ and SEC component
typically are announced on the same day, and because the DOJ and SEC are separate
enforcement agencies, it is common for FCPA enforcement actions to be delayed while one
agency waits for the other agency to finish its investigation. Additional non-substantive
factors that can influence the timing of an FCPA enforcement action include, among other
things, DOJ and SEC staffing issues (including employee departures or leaves), and
securing corporate board approval for resolving an FCPA enforcement action.
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A. Enforcement Actions Against Foreign Companies and Foreign
Nationals
The first significant trend highlighted by the 2011 enforcement year is
the magnitude and quantity of FCPA enforcement actions against foreign
companies and nationals. Foreign companies may be subject to the
FCPA’s jurisdiction if the company is an “issuer” (i.e., it has shares listed
on a U.S. exchange),31 or if the company, “while in the territory of the
United States,” generally engaged in conduct in furtherance of a bribery
scheme.32 Foreign nationals can be subject to the FCPA’s jurisdiction if the
individual is an “officer, director, employee, or agent” of an “issuer”33 or
“domestic concern,”34 or if the individual, “while in the territory of the
United States,” generally engaged in conduct in furtherance of a bribery
scheme.35
As indicated in Table I, approximately ninety percent of DOJ FCPA
monetary collections in 2011 were against foreign companies or nationals.
While less dramatic, as indicated in Table II, foreign issuers paid a
significant portion (approximately thirty-six percent) of SEC FCPA
monetary collections in 2011. Not only are the enforcement agencies
targeting foreign companies, but foreign nationals as well. As indicated in
Table III below, in 2011 the DOJ brought ten individual FCPA
enforcement actions and nine of them were against foreign nationals.
Table III - 2011 DOJ Individual FCPA Enforcement Actions
Individual

Nationality
36

Washington Cruz

U.S. Citizen

Amadeus Richer

German Citizen and Resident
of Brazil
Dual Citizen of Israel and

Uriel Sharef37

31. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3.
36. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Florida Telecommunications Company, Two
Executives, an Intermediary and Two Former Haitian Government Officials Indicted for
Their Alleged Participation in Foreign Bribery Scheme (July 13, 2011), http://www.justice.g
ov/opa/pr/2011/July/11-crm-910.html. Both individuals are associated with Cinergy
Telecommunications.
37. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Eight Former Senior Executives and Agents
of Siemens Charged in Alleged $100 Million Foreign Bribe Scheme (Dec. 13, 2011), http://

KOEHLER__FCPA_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

10

1/23/2013 1:51 PM

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

Herbert Steffen

[Vol. 15:1

Germany
German Citizen

Andres Truppel

Dual Citizen of Germany and
Argentina

Ulrich Bock

Citizen of Germany

Stephan Singer

Citizen of Germany

Eberhard Reichert

Citizen of Germany

Carlos Sergi

Citizen of Argentina

Miguel Czysch

Citizen of Germany and
Resident of Switzerland

As indicated in Table IV below, the SEC brought twelve individual
FCPA enforcement actions in 2011, and all twelve were against foreign
nationals.
Table IV - 2011 SEC Individual FCPA Enforcement Actions
Individual

Nationality

Paul Jennings38

Dual Citizen of the U.K. and
the U.S.
Dual Citizen of Israel and

Urief Sharef39

www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/December/11-crm-1626.html. All individuals are associated
with Siemens. In 2008, Siemens settled the largest enforcement action (in terms of fine or
penalty amount) in FCPA history. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Siemens AG and
Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to
Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal Fines (Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html.
38. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Former CEO of Innospec
for Role in Bribery Scheme (Jan. 24, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/201121.htm (identifying Jennings as the CEO of Innospec, Inc., a company that resolved an
FCPA enforcement action in 2010); Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Files
Settled Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Charges Against Innospec, Inc. for Engaging in
Bribery in Iraq and Indonesia With Total Disgorgement and Criminal Fines of $40.2 Million
(Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21454.htm.
39. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Seven Former Siemens
Executives with Bribing Leaders in Argentina (Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/litigatio
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Germany
Herbert Steffen

Citizen of Germany

Andres Truppel

Dual Citizen of Germany and
Argentina

Ulrich Bock

Citizen of Germany

Stephan Singer

Citizen of Germany

Carlos Sergi

Citizen of Argentina

Bernd Regendantz

Citizen of Germany

Elek Straub40

Citizen of Hungary

Andras Balogh

Citizen of Hungary

Tamas Morvai

Citizen of Hungary

The DOJ and SEC’s enforcement action against former Siemens’
executives is noteworthy. In the 2008 FCPA enforcement action against
Siemens, the enforcement agencies stated that for much of its operations
“overseas, bribery was nothing less than standard operating procedure for
Siemens” and that “a corporate culture [existed at Siemens] in which
bribery was tolerated and even rewarded at the highest levels of the
company.”41 The DOJ’s sentencing memorandum specifically stated that
the company’s compliance, legal, internal audit, and corporate finance
departments all “played a significant role” in the conduct at issue.42
n/litreleases/2011/lr22190.htm. All individuals are associated with Siemens.
40. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Magyar Telekom and
Former Executives with Bribing Officials in Macedonia and Montenegro (Dec. 29, 2011), ht
tp://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-279.htm. All individuals are associated with
Magyar Telekom.
41. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Transcript of Press Conference
Announcing Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act Violations (Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-opa1112.html (explaining Siemens’ guilty plea and detailing the particulars of Siemens’
conduct that allegedly violated the FCPA).
42. U.S. Dep’t of Justice Sentencing Memorandum at 2, United States v. Siemens
Aktiengesellschaft, No. 1:08-cr-00367-RJL (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008), available at http://www
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For a number of years, the DOJ faced intense scrutiny as to why the
most egregious corporate enforcement action in FCPA history did not
result in any individual charges against company employees.43 For
instance, in May 2010 Senator Arlen Specter (then-chair of the Senate
Judiciary Committee) asked DOJ Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer
about the lack of individual prosecutions in the Siemens matter to which
Breuer stated that the DOJ’s investigation as to individuals remained
open.44 During a November 2010 hearing titled “Examination of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,” Senator Specter again asked DOJ Deputy
Assistant Attorney General Greg Andres whether anybody went to jail in
the Siemens case.45 Andres again stated that the investigation remained
open.46 During my testimony at the hearing, Senator Specter asked me to
assist in detailing “egregious examples of individual conduct associated
with the Siemens prosecution,” and I provided to his office detailed
information that could be gleaned from public sources.47 The Siemens
individual enforcement actions from 2011 will likely be difficult cases to
prosecute as, among other things, all of the defendants are located outside
of the U.S. and extradition battles are sure to follow. It remains to be seen
whether the DOJ and SEC are actually committed to prosecuting the
charged individuals or whether the charges were merely symbolic to
assuage criticism.
Professor Brandon Garrett has demonstrated how the rise in corporate
FCPA enforcement actions against foreign companies “bears a family
resemblance” to trends in other substantive areas such as antitrust and
environmental law.48 However, the U.S. law enforcement interest in

.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/siemens/12-12-08siemensvenez-sent.pdf.
43. See, e.g., Joe Palazzolo, Siemens Charges Follow Heat From Critics, CORRUPTION
CURRENTS (Dec. 13, 2011, 1:30 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2011/12/13/s
iemens-charges-follow-heat-from-critics/ (discussing a congressional hearing in which
Senator Specter and the author criticized the lack of individual prosecutions in high-profile
cases).
44. See Mike Koehler, Breuer–Siemens Investigation (As to Individuals) Remains
Open, FCPA PROFESSOR (May 10, 2010), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/breuer-siemensinvestigation-as-to-individuals-remains-open (“[I]ndividuals, executives and others who
were involved [in the Siemens bribery scandal], remain exposed and the matter is not
closed.”).
45. See Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 6 (2010),
[hereinafter Examining Enforcement of the FCPA Hearing], http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov
/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_senate_hearings&docid=f:66921.pdf.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 32–38 (using a chart to identify specific references of egregious
individual conduct).
48. See Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775,
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prosecuting such foreign companies and nationals for instances of alleged
non-U.S. bribery can be debated. For example, can it truly be said that the
U.S. Treasury is the best place for enforcement dollars when a foreign
company allegedly bribes a foreign official?
Yet it is clear from this new era of FCPA enforcement that the
enforcement agencies view their mission as global in nature and the
agencies will not shy away from aggressive jurisdictional theories in
pursuit of foreign bribery riches. For instance, the jurisdictional facts
alleged in the $95 million Magyar Telekom/Deutsche Telekom
enforcement action to support FCPA anti-bribery charges against the
Hungarian company and related charges against its German parent
corporation were two e-mails that passed through or were stored on U.S.
servers.49 Likewise, the jurisdictional facts alleged in the $219 million
enforcement action against Japan’s JGC Corporation were money flowing
through U.S.-based accounts and the faxing or e-mailing of certain
information into the U.S.50 As Professor Garret observed, “litigation of
jurisdiction is almost non-existent in [foreign] corporate prosecutions,
because firms plead guilty rather than litigate such issues.”51 However,
foreign nationals individually charged with FCPA offenses are more likely
to contest aggressive jurisdictional theories when faced with deprivation of
their liberty. Indeed, a notable development from 2011, discussed in more
detail in Part II of this Article, was judicial rejection of the DOJ’s asserted
jurisdiction in prosecution of a foreign national in the Africa Sting case.
Few question the U.S. foreign bribery surplus. After all, FCPA
enforcement has become a reliable revenue source for the federal
government during a period of budget restraints. Commenting on the
increase in FCPA enforcement, the DOJ’s former Assistant Chief for FCPA
enforcement stated, “[t]he government sees a profitable program, and it’s
going to ride that horse until it can’t ride it anymore.”52 Indeed,
1837 (2011), available at http://www.virginialawreview.org/content/pdfs/97/1775.pdf
(observing that, as in other areas, the rise in FCPA enforcement actions is a product of highprofile convictions and greater cooperation between DOJ and other countries).
49. See Information ¶¶ 24, 26, United States v. Magyar Telekom, Plc., No.
1:11CR00597 (E.D. Va. Dec. 29, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/
fcpa/cases/magyar-telekom/2011-12-29-information-magyar-telekom.pdf (citing conduct
that took place entirely in Macedonia with only minor connections to the United States).
50. See Information ¶ 20, United States v. JGC Corp., No. 4:11-cr-00260 (S.D. Tex.
Apr. 6, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/jgc-corp/04-611jgc-corp-info.pdf (listing a Japanese corporation’s overt acts with only minor connections
to the United States).
51. Brandon Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775, 1782
(2011).
52. Joseph Rosenbloom, Here Come the Payoff Police, AM. LAWYER, May 17, 2010, at
14.
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Transparency International (“TI”), a leading civil society organization that
focuses on corruption issues, made the following statement in encouraging
other countries to strengthen the fight against corruption:
[P]rosecutors in the US, Germany and the UK announced a
number of settlements of important foreign bribery cases in
which the defendants agreed to pay fines amounting to many
hundreds of millions of dollars. These settlements demonstrate
the ability of prosecutors to resolve cases without interminable
litigation. The settlement levels provide a sharp wake-up call to
international business regarding the gravity of foreign bribery.
They should also make clear to laggard governments that
investing in adequate enforcement can have substantial returns.53
With good reasons, return on investment is not a concept typically
linked to justice and the rule of law.54 However, TI’s statement (and those
of other civil society organizations that champion “get tough on bribery”
positions seemingly oblivious to the broader public policy implications in
such an approach) helps facilitate a new “global arms race” in which
bringing the highest quantity of bribery-related enforcement actions
appears to be more important than the quality of the actions. Indeed, the
OECD’s recent report on U.S. implementation and enforcement of the
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions (the “OECD Report”) contained the
contradiction of praising the U.S. for its “high level” of enforcement, yet
criticizing and questioning many of the policies and enforcement theories
that yield the “high level” of enforcement.55
Members of Congress are rightfully concerned about the U.S.
crackdown on alleged instances of foreign bribery by foreign companies
and nationals. During the 2010 Senate FCPA hearing, Senator Christopher
Coons (D-DE), a former in-house attorney at a multinational company,
stated:
I am interested in what might someday happen as our allies begin
to join us, the Italians, the U.K. government, others, and then
53. FRITZ HEIMANN & GILLIAN DELL, PROGRESS REPORT 2010: ENFORCEMENT OF THE
OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION 9 (Transparency International 3d ed. 2010), available at
http://www.transparency.cz/doc/2010Progress_Report_2nd_edition_10.9.10.pdf.
54. See, e.g., Monty Raphael, Judiciary Must Be Hard-Wired Into UK Plea
Bargaining, THE LAWYER, Oct. 9, 2011, http://www.thelawyer.com/judiciary-must-be-hardwired-into-uk-plea-bargaining/1009709.article (“If the driver for the criminal regulation of
business is how big a return a country can derive from its investigations, such regulation
will be bereft of integrity and, most importantly, predictability.”).
55. See Mike Koehler, The OECD Report—Initial Observations, FCPA PROFESSOR,
(Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-oecd-report-initial-observations (noting
specific examples of contradictions contained within the OECD Report).
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how we would begin to harmonize the actual enforcement.
Today, we are the only nation that is extending an extraterritorial
reach and going after the citizens of other countries, we may
someday find ourselves on the receiving end of such
transnational actions.56
B. Reliance on Voluntary Disclosures in Bringing Enforcement
Actions
The second enforcement trend highlighted by the 2011 enforcement
year is the enforcement agencies’ continued heavy reliance on corporate
voluntary disclosures or other instances of public disclosure (such as prior
foreign law enforcement investigations) in bringing FCPA enforcement
actions.57 In 2011, ninety-nine percent of the approximate $504 million
collected by the DOJ in FCPA enforcement actions was the result of such
disclosures,58 and ninety-seven percent of the approximate $148 million
collected by the SEC was the result of such disclosures.59
Corporate voluntary disclosures are particularly noteworthy and
represent the proverbial “elephant in the room” that is seldom subject to
frank discussion.60 To be sure, there are some “carrots” and “sticks” that

56. Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 23
(2010), http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_senate_hearings&
docid=f:66921.pdf.
57. Voluntary disclosure generally refers to the process by which a company on its
own (often through internal audits or internal reporting mechanisms) learns of conduct that
might implicate the FCPA and, after an internal investigation, the company’s lawyers
disclose the conduct that might implicate the FCPA to the enforcement agencies even
though, in many cases, the enforcement agencies would likely not otherwise find out about
the conduct. The FCPA does not require such disclosures, but general securities law issues
such as materiality may be relevant. However, few instances of conduct implicating the
FCPA rise to the level of materiality.
58. See Mike Koehler, DOJ Enforcement of the FCPA—Year in Review, FCPA
PROFESSOR (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/doj-enforcement-of-the-fcpayear-in-review-2 (detailing each DOJ corporate FCPA enforcement action in 2011 including
whether the enforcement action was the result of a voluntary disclosure or other instance of
public disclosure such as previous foreign law enforcement investigations).
59. See Mike Koehler, SEC Enforcement of the FCPA—Year in Review, FCPA
PROFESSOR (Jan. 10 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/sec-enforcement-of-the-fcpayear-in-review (detailing each SEC corporate FCPA enforcement action in 2011 including
whether the enforcement action was the result of a voluntary disclosure or other instance of
public disclosure such as previous foreign law enforcement investigations).
60. This may be due to the fact that corporate voluntary disclosures involve potential
conflict of interest issues for lawyers advising corporate clients on the voluntary disclosure
decision. See Mike Koehler, Voluntary Disclosures and the Role of FCPA Counsel, FCPA
PROFESSOR (Dec. 1, 2009), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/voluntary-disclosures-and-the-
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encourage corporate voluntary disclosure. For instance, the DOJ’s
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations state that
whether an organization timely and voluntarily disclosed the alleged
wrongdoing to the DOJ is a factor in determining how the DOJ will resolve
the matter.61 Likewise, the advisory Sentencing Guidelines allow for a
lower fine if a company “reported the offense to appropriate government
authorities, fully cooperated in the investigation, and clearly demonstrated
recognition and affirmative acceptance of responsibility for its criminal
conduct.”62 However, whether these “carrots” are actually awarded to
companies that voluntarily disclose to the enforcement agencies is the
subject of much dispute and debate.63
Moreover, the same “carrots” and “sticks” that may motivate FCPA
voluntary disclosures are present in every DOJ and SEC investigation
regardless of the substantive area of law at issue. Why then is corporate
voluntary disclosure such a prominent feature of FCPA enforcement, but
less prominent in other areas of law?
An answer may be that corporate voluntary disclosures feed a thriving
and growing FCPA industry whose participants, both in the government
and the private sector, have vested interests in seeing it continue.64 The
enforcement agencies favor and encourage self-reporting because it makes
their jobs easier and is cost-effective from a budget and resource
standpoint. Private-sector participants in FCPA industry—law firms,
forensic accounting firms, investigative firms, etc.—have an interest in
voluntary disclosures because, to state the obvious, voluntary disclosures
lead to additional work. It is a well-known fact in the FCPA industry that
voluntary disclosures, even as to conduct limited in scope, often prompt the
enforcement agencies to ask the “where else” question that results in multiyear, global reviews of any company that voluntarily discloses. For
role-of-fcpa-counsel (discussing corporate voluntary disclosures and potential conflict of
interest issues FCPA counsel faces in advising companies as to disclosure issues).
61. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-28.000 (2008)
(providing a set of factors prosecutors should consider in determining whether to bring
criminal charges against a business organization, or to negotiate a plea or other agreement
such as a non-prosecution or deferred prosecution agreement).
62. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(g) (2011).
63. See, e.g., Nick Elliott, Regulators Like Self-Reporting, Some Attorneys Aren’t Sure,
CORRUPTION CURRENTS (Mar. 31, 2011, 3:22 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruptioncurrents/2011/03/31/regulators-like-self-reporting-some-attorneys-arent-sure/
(discussing
the potential negative consequences of self-reporting).
64. See, e.g., Nathan Vardi, The Bribery Racket, FORBES, May 24, 2010, at 70-77
(detailing, based on comments from the DOJ’s former FCPA chief, how the increase in
FCPA enforcement is “good business for law firms . . . good business for accounting firms,
it’s good business for consulting firms, the media—and Justice Department lawyers who
create the marketplace and then get [themselves] a job”).
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instance, the Tyson Foods enforcement action focused on conduct in
Mexico involving one company subsidiary, which “comprised less than one
percent of Tyson’s global net sales.”65 Even though approximately eightyfive percent to ninety percent of Tyson’s sales were domestic, in resolving
the enforcement action, Tyson “subjected to rigorous FCPA reviews” all of
its wholly-owned production facilities, including those located outside of
Mexico.66
Commenting on this trend, FCPA practitioner Claudius Sokenu stated
as follows:
What has caused the most angst is . . . the oppressive and
dictatorial manner in which the government causes corporations
to expend significant resources in conducting overly broad
investigations that cost millions of dollars with little more than a
hunch that potentially violative conduct is afoot. Time and time
again, we see internal investigations that span dozens of countries
in one company and the cost of doing those multi-country
internal investigations, and the disruption to business, not to
mention a corporation’s reputational damage. This can be
significant. I think what is most needed is prosecutorial
discretion from the SEC and Justice Department on what to
investigate and the breadth of the investigation.67
That the “where else” question is asked in the absence of any
meaningful check or judicial oversight raises a host of problematic ethical
and policy issues. For example, the enforcement attorneys who ask the
“where else” question increase the demand for private-sector FCPA
services and frequently leave government service for the FCPA privatesector.68 FCPA counsel, to whom the “where else” question is posed, have
little incentive to push-back as the “where else” question often leads to
multi-year, multi-country billing bonanzas. Even if FCPA counsel were
65. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 3, United States v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No.
1:11-cr-00037-RWR (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fr
aud/fcpa/cases/tyson-foods/02-10-11tyson_foods_dpa.pdf.
66. Id.
67. Providing Excellent Service Through a Global Perspective, METRO CORP.
COUNSEL, June 2011, at 11.
68. The examples of DOJ or SEC FCPA enforcement attorneys leaving government
service for the private FCPA bar are numerous. See, e.g., Mike Koehler, Friday Roundup,
FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-21
(describing various attorneys’ transition from the Department of Justice to white-collar
defense practices in private practice, and in particular, Mark Mendelsohn’s move to Paul
Weiss); Mike Koehler, News Corp. Hires Mendelsohn . . . And More On The Revolving
Door, FCPA PROFESSOR (July 21, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/news-corp-hiresmendelsohn-and-more-on-the-revolving-door (discussing further the transition from the
public sector to private practice, and public policy implications).
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inclined to push back on behalf of clients, cooperation in the government’s
investigation remains one influential factor in the enforcement agencies’
charging decisions and ultimate fine and penalty amounts.69
The predominance of corporate voluntary disclosures in this new era
of FCPA enforcement has clearly contributed to the creation and growth of
a vibrant industry and FCPA issues, no matter how limited in scope, often
turn into a boondoggle for many involved.70 Yet, corporate counsel and
others making business decisions on behalf of a company need to
understand that thoroughly investigating an issue, promptly implementing
remedial measures, and effectively revising and enhancing compliance
policies and procedures—internally, and without disclosure to the
enforcement agencies—is a perfectly acceptable, legitimate, and legal
response to FCPA issues in all but the rarest of circumstances.
C. Extensive Use of Alternative Resolution Vehicles
The third enforcement trend highlighted by the 2011 enforcement year
is the extensive use of non-prosecution agreements (“NPAs”) and deferred
prosecution agreements (“DPAs”) to resolve corporate FCPA enforcement
actions. These alternative resolution vehicles do not result in any actual
prosecuted charges against the company entering into the agreement and
the vehicles are not subject to any meaningful judicial scrutiny.71 Such
alternative resolution vehicles are used in other substantive areas of law,
but the predominate use of such vehicles is to resolve FCPA inquiries.72 As
detailed in Table I, in 2011, nine of the eleven DOJ corporate FCPA

69. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-28.000 (2008) (listing
cooperation as a factor in charging decisions); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
8C2.5(g) (2011), (listing cooperation as a factor in sentencing decisions).
70. For example, in 2008, Avon Products Inc. began an internal investigation as to
FCPA issues in China and other countries. The investigation has blossomed into
compliance reviews “in a number of other countries, selected to represent each of the
Company’s international geographic segments.” Avon Products, Inc., Quarterly Report
(Form 10-Q) (Oct. 27, 2011). Avon, as of February 2011, has reportedly spent over $150
million on its FCPA internal investigation, which is not yet complete. See Aruna
Viswanatha, Avon Spending on FCPA Investigation Tops $150 Million, MAIN JUSTICE (Feb.
24, 2011, 10:28 AM), http://www.mainjustice.com/justanticorruption/2011/02/24/avonspending-on-fcpa-investigation-tops-150-million/.
71. See Façade supra note 1, at 933-39 (discussing the increase in NPAs and DPAs
and various criticisms of NPAs and DPAs).
72. See GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2011 YEAR-END UPDATE ON CORPORATE
DEFERRED PROSECUTION AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS (2012), http://www.gibsondu
nn.com/publications/Documents/2011YearEndUpdate-CorporateDeferredProsecutionNonProsecutionAgreements.pdf (discussing the use of NPAs and DPAs to resolve various
enforcement actions, including FCPA enforcement actions).
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enforcement actions (eighty-two percent) were resolved via an NPA or
DPA.73
The DOJ first used an alternative resolution vehicle in an FCPA
enforcement action in 2004.74 Since 2004, an NPA or DPA has been used
to resolve forty-seven of the sixty-one (seventy-seven percent) core
corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement actions.75 It is clear that the DOJ’s use
of such vehicles in the FCPA context is one of the reasons for the increase
in FCPA enforcement actions. Mark Mendelsohn, the former deputy chief
of the DOJ’s FCPA unit, stated that if the DOJ did not have the option of
resolving FCPA enforcement actions with NPAs or DPAs, the DOJ “would
certainly bring fewer cases.”76 Likewise, the OECD Report stated as
follows: “It seems quite clear that the use of these agreements is one of the
reasons for the impressive FCPA enforcement record in the U.S.”77
Use of such resolution vehicles to resolve alleged corporate criminal
liability in the FCPA context and other areas present two distinct, yet
equally problematic, public policy issues. First, resolution vehicles allow
egregious instances of corporate conduct to be resolved too lightly.
Because the government does not file actual charges to which a company
must plead, such conduct is often resolved without adequate sanctions and
without achieving maximum deterrence.78 Indeed, it is notable to observe
73. Further, a notable development from 2011 is that the SEC used such a vehicle (a
DPA) for the first time in an FCPA enforcement against Tenaris. See Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Tenaris, S.A., (May 17, 2011), http://www.sec.g
ov/news/press/2011/2011-112-dpa.pdf. In January 2010, the SEC announced “a series of
measures to further strengthen its enforcement program by encouraging greater cooperation
from individuals and companies in the agency’s investigations and enforcement actions.”
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Initiative to Encourage
Individuals and Companies to Cooperate and Assist in Investigations (Jan. 13, 2010),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-6.htm. Among the measures was use of NPAs
and DPAs.
74. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, InVision Technologies Inc. Enters into
Agreement with the United States (Dec. 6, 2004), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2004/Dece
mber/04_crm_780.htm (providing the key terms of the Department’s agreement with
InVision Technologies, Inc.).
75. See Mike Koehler, DOJ Prosecution of Individual—Are Other Factors at Play?,
FCPA PROFESSOR (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/doj-prosecution-ofindividuals-are-other-factors-at-play (analyzing FCPA enforcement actions as of September
2011).
76. Mark Mendelsohn on the Rise of FCPA Enforcement, CORP. CRIME REP., Sept. 13,
2010, at 15.
77. OECD WORKING GRP. ON BRIBERY IN INT’L BUS., UNITED STATES: PHASE 3 REPORT
ON THE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC
OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 2009 REVISED
RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATING BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
(2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/49/46213841.pdf.
78. See e.g., Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, As Wall Street Polices Itself,
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that seven of the top ten enforcement actions (in terms of fine and penalty
amount) in the FCPA’s history have been resolved with an NPA or DPA.79
The second is that such vehicles, because of the same factors discussed
above, nudge companies to agree to the vehicles for reasons of riskaversion and efficiency, and not necessarily because the conduct at issue
actually violates the FCPA.80 Thus, use of NPAs or DPAs contributes to
“over-prosecution” of business conduct,81 while at the same time allowing
for “under-prosecution” of egregious instance of corporate bribery. For
these reasons, it is in the public interest to abolish these resolution vehicles.
D. Lack of Individual Prosecutions
The fourth FCPA enforcement trend highlighted by the 2011
enforcement year is the continued lack of individual prosecutions in most
corporate FCPA enforcement actions. In my 2010 Senate testimony, I
stated that corporate fine-only FCPA enforcement is not effective and does
not adequately deter future FCPA violations.82 Rather, what is key to
achieving deterrence is prosecuting individuals to the extent the
individual’s conduct legitimately satisfies the elements of an FCPA antibribery violation.83

Prosecutors Use Softer Approach, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2011, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/08/business/in-shift-federal-prosecutors-are-lenient-ascompanies-break-the-law.html?_r=2&ref=gretchenmorgenson (detailing the rise in NPAs
and DPAs and addressing, among other things, whether the agreements run the risk of
“letting companies off too easily”).
79. Richard A. Cassin, With Magyar in New Top Ten, It’s 90% Non-U.S., THE FCPA
BLOG, (Dec. 29, 2011, 1:28 PM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011/12/29/with-magyarin-new-top-ten-its-90-non-us.html (listing the top ten FCPA enforcement actions in terms of
fine or penalty amount).
80. See Façade, supra note 1, at 924-29 (discussing the increase in NPAs and DPAs
and various criticisms of NPAs and DPAs). Indeed, former DOJ FCPA chief Mark
Mendelsohn stated that the “danger” of NPAs and DPAs “is that it is tempting for the [DOJ]
or the SEC since it too now has these options available, to seek to resolve cases through
DPAs or NPAs that don’t actually constitute violations of the law.” Mark Mendelsohn on
the Rise of FCPA Enforcement, 24 CORP. CRIME REP. 35, 35 (Sept. 10, 2010).
81. See, e.g., Reynolds Holding, Settlements Feed U.S. Prosecutor Overreach,
REUTERS BREAKINGVIEWS (Sept. 19, 2011, 10:03 AM), http://www.trust.org/trustlaw/news/b
reakingviews-settlements-feed-us-prosecutor-overreach (stating that settlements encourage
federal prosecutors to overreach).
82. Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 14-15 (2010)
(statement of Mike Koehler, Professor at Southern Illinois University School of Law).
83. Id.; see also James Stewart, Bribery, But Nobody Was Charged, N.Y. TIMES, June
24, 2011, at B1 (“[S]urely bribery, not to mention other forms of corporate wrongdoing,
would be more effectively deterred if someone was actually held accountable for it.”).
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Nevertheless, FCPA enforcement largely remains corporate
enforcement only. Of the eleven corporate FCPA enforcement actions
brought by the DOJ in 2011, only three (twenty-seven percent) have
resulted, at present, in related enforcement actions against company
employees.84 Likewise, of the thirteen corporate FCPA enforcement
actions brought by the SEC in 2011, only two (fifteen percent) have
resulted, at present, in related enforcement actions against company
employees.85
To be sure, the 2011 enforcement year ended with a bang as the DOJ
and SEC charged several former foreign executives of Siemens and
Magyar Telekom.86 In addition, as demonstrated by the Siemens individual
indictments, individual prosecutions can follow years after a related
corporate FCPA enforcement action. However, the lack of individual
prosecutions in the majority of corporate FCPA enforcement actions causes
one to legitimately wonder whether the conduct serving as the basis for the
corporate enforcement action was engaged in by ghosts.
On the other hand, an equally plausible reason for the lack of
individual FCPA prosecutions in connection with corporate FCPA
enforcement actions may be the quality of the corporate enforcement
action. As detailed above, a significant majority of DOJ corporate FCPA
enforcement actions are resolved via alternative resolution vehicles and,
given the dynamics at play, companies are often nudged to agree to these
vehicles for reasons of risk-aversion and efficiency and not necessarily
because the conduct at issue actually violates the FCPA. Individuals, on
the other hand, face a deprivation of personal liability in FCPA
enforcement actions, and are more likely to force the DOJ to satisfy its high
burden of proof as to all FCPA elements.
In support of this theory for the lack of related individual prosecutions
in the majority of corporate FCPA enforcement actions is the following
fact: Since the advent of alternative resolution vehicles in the FCPA
context in 2004, only fifteen percent of corporate FCPA enforcement
actions resolved with such vehicles have resulted in related charges against
company employees or those affiliated with the company.87 In the view of
many, the current era of corporate criminal law enforcement “encourage[s]
prosecutors to pursue what they can punish, not what the law prohibits,”88
and “prosecutors start to believe that the law means whatever they have
84. Koehler, supra note 58.
85. Koehler, supra note 59.
86. See supra notes 36, 38, 39 (documenting enforcement actions against foreign
executives).
87. Koehler, supra note 75.
88. Holding, supra note 81.
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been able to get [corporate] defendants to agree to” in resolution
documents.89
Against this backdrop, perhaps a more appropriate question should be
not why do so few DOJ corporate FCPA enforcement actions result in
individual prosecutions, but rather, do many DOJ corporate FCPA
enforcement actions actually evidence proof beyond a reasonable doubt
that FCPA violations occurred?
As highlighted in Part I of this Article, FCPA enforcement in 2011
may have been mild compared to FCPA enforcement in 2010, but the
continuation of observable trends raise several basic questions as the FCPA
nears its thirty-fifth year.
As to the number, magnitude, and quantity of FCPA enforcement
actions against foreign companies and nationals: What will be the impact
of the enforcement agencies’ global mission of enforcing the FCPA against
foreign companies and nationals often on aggressive jurisdictional
theories? Is foreign bribery enforcement a desirable form of government
investment and revenue? Will a focus on return of investment facilitate a
new “global arms race” in which bringing the highest quantity of
enforcement actions is more important than the quality of the actions?
As to the reliance on corporate voluntary disclosures in bringing
FCPA enforcement actions: Does this dynamic feed a thriving and
growing FCPA industry that has vested interests in seeing a continuation of
aggressive and broad enforcement and inquiries?
As to the extensive use of alternative resolution vehicles to resolve
FCPA enforcement actions: Do NPAs and DPAs contribute to “overprosecution” of business conduct while at the same time allowing “underprosecution” of egregious instances of corporate bribery?
As to the lack of individual prosecutions in most corporate FCPA
enforcement actions: Is corporate bribery engaged in by ghosts or is a
reason for the general lack of individual prosecutions in corporate FCPA
enforcement actions due to the quality of the corporate enforcement action?
II.

FCPA SCRUTINY—2011

The big story from 2011 is not that FCPA enforcement statistics
decreased compared to 2010, but that the FCPA was subjected to the most
meaningful public scrutiny in its history. Public scrutiny of the FCPA and
FCPA enforcement came from multiple directions: Congress, the judiciary,
and others such as academics, the press, and public interest groups. As

89. Michael Levy, Prosecutorial Common Law, FCPA PROFESSOR, (Mar. 16, 2011),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/prosecutorial-common-law.
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discussed below, this scrutiny reveals that as the FCPA nears its thirty-fifth
year, basic legal and policy questions remain as to the purpose, scope, and
effectiveness of the FCPA and FCPA enforcement.
A. Congressional Scrutiny
Historically, Congress has taken little interest in the FCPA since its
last substantive reforms in 1988.90 However, congressional interest in the
FCPA and FCPA enforcement has rightfully grown as FCPA enforcement
has increased over the past few years, as enforcement theories have become
more aggressive, and as the competiveness of U.S. business in the global
marketplace has declined.
In June 2011, picking up where the Senate left off in late 2010 on
FCPA reform,91 a House Judiciary Subcommittee held an FCPA hearing
focused on a wide range of issues.92 In many ways, the hearing was similar
to FCPA reform hearings twenty-five years ago, in that a common theme
was whether the current FCPA enforcement environment harms U.S.
business.
In opening the hearing, Chairman James Sensenbrenner (R-WI) noted
that “the world was a very different place” when the FCPA was passed in
1977, but since then “the world has turned upside down . . . China has
become a global manufacturing power, [and] [t]he nature of overseas
business has changed.”93 Placing FCPA enforcement in the context of the
recent economic downturn, Sensenbrenner stated that “FCPA prosecutions
should be effective and fair,” yet at the same time “predictable” so that the
“rules of the road . . . [are] clear[]” so that “business can start moving
again.”94 In an opening statement, Robert Scott (D-VA) commented on the
necessity of periodically reviewing laws to make sure they “remain fair and
just.”95 Representative Scott’s remark was similar to that made by William
Brock (U.S. Trade Representative) in a 1981 New York Times opinion piece
when he observed as follows:

90. The FCPA was also amended in 1998 to incorporate certain aspects of the OECD
Convention into the FCPA. See Declaration of Prof. Michael J. Koehler in Support of
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts One Through Ten of the Indictment at ¶ 17, United
States v. Stuart Carson, No. 8:09-cr-00077-JVS (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2011) [hereinafter
Koehler’s Carson Declaration] (providing an overview of the FCPA’s legislative history).
91. See Examining Enforcement of the FCPA Hearing, supra note 45.
92. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 47 (2011)
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/112th/112-47_66886.pdf.
93. Id. at 1.
94. Id. at 2.
95. Id. at 4.
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Just because the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act spotlights a
sensitive subject . . . some people turn a blind eye to its
shortcomings rather than risk being accused of being “soft on
bribery.” That is too easy a way out. Retreating from
controversy will not cure the law’s deficiencies. . . . As it is now,
the act penalizes the innocent more predictably than the guilty,
and along with both, our competitiveness in world trade.96
Issues explored during the House hearing included: Clarifying the
FCPA’s definition of “foreign official” and “instrumentality”; adding a
compliance defense to the FCPA; successor liability issues; and DOJ
decision-making in FCPA cases, including prosecutorial discretion and
declination decisions.97
The 2011 House hearing was much more contentious than the
Senate’s 2010 FCPA hearing. The House hearing reflected the growing
divide between the legitimate concerns of many as to this new era of FCPA
enforcement and the enforcement agencies’ seemingly “circle the wagons”
approach when it comes to FCPA reform or critique of its FCPA
enforcement program. For instance, in closing the hearing, Chairman
Sensenbrenner sternly told the DOJ witness that it “would behoove the
[DOJ] to realize that this statute needs updating” because the current
enforcement climate has caused U.S. business not to pursue legitimate
business activity, thereby putting U.S. business at a significant
disadvantage to foreign companies.98
During the hearing, Chairman Sensenbrenner said that his Committee
would be drafting an FCPA reform bill.99 The force with which the
statement was made gave the impression that a reform bill would soon
follow the hearing. However, the much-anticipated reform bill was not
introduced in 2011 and it is possible that Congress will delay introducing a
reform bill until the DOJ issues its promised FCPA guidance in 2012.100

96. Bill Brock, Editorial, Shifting Gears on Bribes Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1981,
at E19.
97. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112TH CONG. 3-4 (2011),
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/112th/112-47_66886.pdf.
98. Id. at 75.
99. Id.
100. In November 2011, Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer announced that in
2012 the DOJ hopes to “release detailed new guidance on the [FCPA’s] criminal and civil
enforcement provisions.” Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen., Address at the 26th
National Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 8, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2011/crm-speech-111108.html. DOJ guidance
on the FCPA would be long-coming. The FCPA’s 1988 amendments required that the
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Whenever an FCPA reform bill is introduced, and whatever its
specific provisions, FCPA reform in 2012 is far from a sure thing. The
topic is a political hot potato, particularly during an election season, and
history instructs that substantive FCPA reform can drag on for many
years.101
While 2011 did not witness a comprehensive FCPA reform bill, the
year did witness certain FCPA reform bills introduced on Capitol Hill.
However, the bills, even if enacted, will likely have limited scope and
application.
Attorney General, “after consultation with the [SEC], the Secretary of Commerce, the
United States Trade Representative, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of the
Treasury, and after obtaining the views of all interested persons through public notice and
comment procedures, shall determine to what extent compliance with [the anti-bribery
provisions] would be enhanced and the business community would be assisted by further
clarification” of its various provisions.” Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 §
5003(d), Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1417 (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. § 78dd1) (2012). Among other things, Congress requested that the Attorney General consider
issuing guidelines as to “general precautionary procedures [companies] may use on a
voluntary basis to conform their conduct to the Department of Justice’s present enforcement
policy . . . .” Id. § 5003(d)(2). Following the 1988 Congressional mandate, the DOJ did
issue a formal notice inviting all interested persons “to submit their views concerning the
extent to which compliance with [the anti-bribery provisions] would be enhanced and the
business community assisted by further clarification of the provisions of the anti-bribery
provisions through the issuance of guidelines.” Anti-Bribery Provisions of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 54 Fed. Reg. 40,918 (Oct. 4, 1989). However, the DOJ stated that
“[o]nly 5 [sic] responses were received, and 3 [sic] of the responses were to the effect that
guidelines were unnecessary.” Based on this information, it declined to issue FCPA
compliance guidelines envisioned by Congress. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION AND 1997
RECOMMENDATION (1999), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/briberyininternationalbusi
ness/anti-briberyconvention/2390377.pdf. In July 1990, the DOJ stated as follows:
After consideration of the comments received, and after consultation with the
appropriate agencies, the Attorney General has determined that no guidelines
are necessary. . . . [C]ompliance with the [anti-bribery provisions] would not be
enhanced nor would the business community be assisted by further clarification
of these provisions through the issuance of guidelines.
Anti-Bribery Provisions, 55 Fed. Reg. 28,694 (July 12, 1990).
101. For instance, bills addressing the various substantive reforms in the FCPA’s 1988
amendments were first introduced in Congress in 1980 and reform stalled for many years.
See, e.g., Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act, S. 2763, 96th Cong.
(1980); Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act, S. 708, 97th Cong.
(1981); Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act, S. 414, 98th Cong.
(1983); Foreign Trade Practices Act of 1983, H.R. 2157, 98th. Cong. (1983); Business
Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act, S. 430, 99th Cong. (1985); Foreign Trade
Practices Act of 1986, H.R. 4389, 99th Cong. (1986); Export Enhancement Act of 1986,
H.R. 4708, 99th Cong. (1986); Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1987, H.R. 3,
100th Cong. (1987); Trade, Employment, and Productivity Act of 1987, S. 539, 99th Cong.
(1987); Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1987, S. 1420, 100th Cong. (1987).
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In November 2011, Representative Ed Perlmutter (D-CO) introduced
H.R. 3531 (the “Foreign Business Bribery Prohibition Act of 2011”).102
Substantively similar to previous bills Perlmutter has introduced,103 H.R.
3531 would authorize certain private causes of action for violations under
the FCPA by foreign concerns that damage domestic business. The bill
would likely have limited application, as it seeks to amend only the 78dd-3
prong of the FCPA that is applicable to conduct by “persons other than
issuers or domestic concerns” and the prong that has the narrowest
jurisdictional scope. Thus, the bill’s application would be limited to
instances in which a foreign company (one without shares listed on a U.S.
exchange) “while in the territory” of the U.S., makes use of an
instrumentality of interstate commerce in furtherance of a foreign bribery
scheme that harms U.S. business.
In December 2011, Representative Peter Welch (D-VT) introduced
H.R. 3588 (“Overseas Contractor Reform Act”).104 Substantively similar to
a bill that unanimously passed the House in 2010,105 H.R. 3588 states that
“[i]t is the policy of the United States Government that no Government
contracts or grants should be awarded to individuals or companies who
violate the [FCPA] . . . .”106 This is a sound policy statement and a
debarment penalty for egregious instances of corporate bribery involving
high-level executives or board participation is in the public interest.
However, the problem with H.R. 3588, as with the previous bill, is its
trigger for debarment—“any person found to be in violation of the [FCPA’s
anti-bribery provisions] shall be proposed for debarment . . . within 30 days
after the judgment finding such person to be in violation becomes final.”107
Given the DOJ’s use of NPAs and DPAs, as well as its discretion in
charging decisions, few companies in this new era of FCPA enforcement
are, as strange as it may sound, ever “found to be in violation of the
FCPA.”108 For instance, as detailed in Table I above, in 2011, nine of the

102. H.R. 3531, 112th Cong. (2010), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS112hr3531ih/pdf/BILLS-112hr3531ih.pdf.
103. See Foreign Business Bribery Prohibition Act of 2009, H.R. 2152 111th Cong.
(2009), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-2152 (using language similar to
its successor, H.R. 3531, authorizing certain private rights of action under the FCPA for
foreign violations damaging domestic businesses).
104. H.R. 3588, 112th Cong. (2011), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billte
xt.xpd?bill=h112-3588.
105. Overseas Contractor Reform Act, H.R. 5366, 111th Cong. (2010), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr5366eh/pdf/BILLS-111hr5366eh.pdf.
106. H.R. 3588, 112th Cong. (2011), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h112-3588.
107. Id.
108. Id.

092726E6-C225-41CF-9832-AC0ECA330BFDKOEHLER_FCPA_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

FCPA UNDER THE MICROSCOPE

1/23/2013 1:51 PM

27

eleven DOJ corporate FCPA enforcement actions (eighty-two percent)
were resolved with an NPA or DPA.
Thus, Representative Welch’s bill again represents impotent
legislation and demonstrates that few members of Congress understand
how the FCPA is actually enforced, or if they do, that creating the illusion
of addressing a problem is more important than actually addressing a
problem.
B. Judicial Scrutiny
During the past decade of the FCPA’s resurgence, the DOJ has
enforced the FCPA almost exclusively against cooperating corporate
defendants after corporate voluntary disclosures. The role of the judiciary
has largely been limited to sentencing the few individual defendants
charged with FCPA violations. In many of those instances, judges
significantly rejected the DOJ’s sentencing recommendations.109 Because
of the SEC’s “neither admit nor deny” settlement policy, it is even more
rare for the judiciary to scrutinize the SEC’s enforcement of the FCPA.110
However, one significant development from 2011, and one to follow in
2012, is Judge Jed Rakoff’s (S.D.N.Y.) rejection of the SEC’s settlement
policy in a non-FCPA case, and how the Second Circuit will rule in the
appeal.111
Judicial scrutiny of FCPA enforcement in 2011 included several cases
of first impression and focused on: “foreign official” issues; the FCPA’s
knowledge element; the DOJ’s conduct in FCPA investigations and
prosecutions; rulings in the Africa Sting cases, including as to jurisdictional
issues; determining the victims of bribery; and use of the Travel Act to
combat alleged commercial bribery.

109. See Mike Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Enters a New Era, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 99, 137-38 (2011) (highlighting instances in the
Western District of Virginia, Central District of California, and Eastern District of
Pennsylvania in which district judges rejected DOJ sentencing recommendations, and noting
that this may signal “future judicial scrutiny regarding FCPA enforcement theories . . . .”).
110. See Façade, supra note 1, at 942-44 (elaborating on the SEC’s “neither admit nor
deny” policy and noting the general lack of judicial analysis of this policy).
111. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d, 336
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (denying the settlement between the parties by noting, among other things,
that the SEC’s “neither admit nor deny” settlement policy is “hallowed by history, but not
by reason” and stating that the policy “deprives the Court of even the most minimal
assurance that the substantial injunctive relief it is being asked to impose has any basis in
fact”).

KOEHLER__FCPA_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

28

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW
i.

1/23/2013 1:51 PM

[Vol. 15:1

Foreign Official

For many years, a significant percentage of FCPA enforcement
actions have been based on the prosecution theory that state-owned or
state-controlled enterprises (“SOEs”)—even those with publicly-traded
shares
and/or
minority foreign
government
investment—are
“instrumentalities” of a foreign government and that SOE employees are
therefore “foreign officials” under the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.112
As demonstrated by the below table, this trend continued in 2011 as
approximately eighty percent of corporate FCPA enforcement actions
involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged SOEs. These
enterprises and entities ranged from manufacturing companies, oil and gas
companies, telecommunications companies, healthcare entities, engineering
firms, liquor stores, and insurance companies. In 2011, a new minimum
threshold was also advanced by the enforcement agencies for what
constitutes an SOE. The Comverse Technologies enforcement action
detailed below focused on individuals connected to Hellenic
Telecommunications Organization S.A. (“OTE”). A review of OTE’s
annual reports indicates that during the time period relevant to the
enforcement action, the Greek government owned only between thirtythree
percent
and
thirty-eight
percent
of
OTE.113

112. See Koehler, supra note 2, at 108-16 (showing that approximately sixty percent of
corporate FCPA enforcement actions in 2010 involved (in whole or in part) foreign officials
who were employees of alleged SOEs); see also Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of Its Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389, 410-12
(2010) (showing that approximately sixty-six percent of corporate FCPA enforcement
actions in 2009 involved, in whole or in part, foreign officials who were employees of
alleged SOEs).
113. Mike Koehler, “Foreign Official” Limbo—The Bar Has Been Lowered, FCPA
PROFESSOR (Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/foreign-official-limbo-the-barhas-been-lowered. The largest category of investors in OTE during the relevant time period
were international institutional investors.
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Table V - The “Foreign Officials” of 2011114
Enforcement Action
Maxwell Technologies

Alleged “Foreign Official”








DOJ115
“Pinggao Group Co. Ltd.
(formerly Pingdingshan High
Voltage Switch-gear Works)
(‘Pinggao Group’) was a
state-owned manufacturer of
electric-utility infrastructure
in Henan Province, People’s
Republic of China (‘PRC’ or
‘China’).”
“New Northeast Electric
Shenygan HV
Switchgear Co., Ltd.
(‘Shenygang HV’) was a
state-owned manufacturer of
electric-utility infrastructure
in Liaoning Province, PRC.”
“Xi-an XD High Voltage
Apparatus Co., Ltd. a/k/a
Xi’an Shinky High Voltage
Electric Co., Ltd. (‘Xi-an
XD’) was a state-owned
manufacturer
of
electric
utility
infrastructure
in
Shaanxi Province, PRC.”
“[P]ayments . . . conveyed to
officials of
foreign

114. This table is based on information from the DOJ or SEC’s actual charging
documents. As evident from the information in the table, in certain instances the
enforcement agencies describe the “foreign official” with reasonable specificity; in other
instances with virtually no specificity. Some of the enforcement actions in the table
technically involved only FCPA books and records and internal control charges. However,
actual charges in most FCPA enforcement actions hinge on voluntary disclosure,
cooperation, collateral consequences, and other non-legal issues. Thus, even if an FCPA
enforcement action is resolved without FCPA anti-bribery charges, the action remains very
much about the “foreign officials” involved.
115. Information at 4, United States v. Maxwell Techs., Inc., No. 3:11-cr-00329-JM
(S.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/c
ases/maxwell/01-31-11maxwell-tech-info.pdf.
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governments employed by
state-owned
entities,
including Pinggao Group,
Shenyang HV, and Xi-an
XD . . . .”


Tyson Foods





SEC116
Presumably the same as
above, although the SEC
complaint merely refers to
“officials at several Chinese
state-owned entities.”
DOJ117
“The Government of Mexico
administers an inspection
program, Tipo
Inspeccion Federal (‘TIF’),
for meat-processing
facilities. . . . The inspection
program at each facility is
supervised by an on-site
veterinarian who is a
government employee
(‘“TIF veterinarian’”) paid by
the state, who ensures that all
exports are in conformity with
Mexican health and safety
laws. Therefore,
TIF veterinarians are foreign
officials as defined by the
FCPA . . . .”
“Wives of the TIF
veterinarians.”

116. Complaint at 1, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Maxwell Techs., Inc., No. 1:11-cv-00258
(D.D.C. Jan. 31, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp
21832.pdf.
117. Information at 3, United States v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 1:11-cr-00037-RWR
(D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/tysonfoods.html.
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Ball Corp.
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SEC118
Same as above.
SEC119
“[G]overnment officials in
South Korea and China.”
“The foreign government
officials involved worked for
sixteen
South
Korean
government
entities
(‘SKGE’).”;
“Chief
of
Operations for the Electronic
Operations
Division
of
SKGE 1 . . . .; “[M]anager of
the
government-controlled
SKGE 2 . . . .; “. . .SKGE 3’s
Director of Planning . . . .”;
“SKGE 4 was a state-owned
agency of the South Korea
government . . . an employee
of SKGE 4 responsible for
reviewing personal computer
procurement
bids . . . .”;
“. . .Director of SKGE 5′s
information
technology
department”;
“. . .Government Officials of
SKGE 6″; “. . .[K]ey decision
makers
at
ten
other
SKGEs . . . .”
“. . .Chinese
government
officials”;
employees
of
“government-owned
or
controlled
customers
in
China . . . .”
SEC120

118. Complaint at 1, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-00350RMC (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011
/comp21851.pdf.
119. Complaint at 1, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., No. 1:11-cv00563 (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011
/comp21889.pdf.
120. Ball Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 64123, 2011 WL 1099562 (Mar. 24, 2011),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2011/34-64123.pdf.
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“[E]mployees of the
Argentine government to
secure the importation of
prohibited used machinery
and the exportation of raw
materials at reduced tariffs.”
“[G]overnment customs
officials . . . .”
DOJ121
“The Nigerian National
Petroleum Corporation
(‘NNPC’) was a Nigerian
government-owned company
charged with development of
Nigeria’s oil and gas wealth
and regulation of the
country’s oil and gas
industry. NNPC was a
shareholder in certain joint
ventures with multinational
oil companies. NNPC was an
entity and instrumentality of
the Government of Nigeria
and its officers and employees
were ‘foreign officials’ within
the meaning of the
FCPA . . . .”
“Nigeria LNG Limited
(‘NLNG’) was created by the
Nigerian government to
develop the Bonny Island
Project and was the entity that
awarded the related . . .
contracts. The largest
shareholder of NLNG was
NNPC, which owned 49% of
NLNG. The other owners of
NLNG were multinational oil

121. Information at 5, United States v. JGC Corp., No. 4:11-cr-00260 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 6,
2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/jgc-corp/04-6-11jgccorp-info.pdf.
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companies. Through the
NLNG board members
appointed by NNPC, among
other means, the Nigerian
government exercised control
over NLNG, including but not
limited to the ability to block
the award of . . . contracts.
NLNG was an entity and
instrumentality of the
Government of Nigeria and
its officers and employees
were ‘foreign officials’ within
the meaning of the
FCPA . . . .”
“[B]ribes to officials of the
executive branch of the
Government of Nigeria,
officials of NNPC, officials of
NLNG, and others.”
DOJ122
“[I]ndividuals connected to
OTE, including employees of
OTE’s subsidiaries Cosmote,
Cosmofon, and Cosmorom, in
order to obtain purchase
orders from those companies
for Comverse Ltd. products
and services . . . .” OTE is
“Hellenic Telecommunications Organization S.A. . . . a
telecommunications provider
controlled and partially
owned by the Greek
government. The Greek
government was OTE’s
largest single shareholder and

122. Non-Prosecution Agreement at 7, U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Comverse Tech. Inc.,
(Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/rae-comverse/04-0611comverse-npa.pdf.
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maintained an interest in over
one-third of OTE’s issued
share capital.”

Johnson & Johnson







SEC123
Same as above.
DOJ124
“Greece has a national
healthcare system wherein
most Greek hospitals are
publicly owned and operated.
Health care providers who
work at publiclyowned hospitals (‘HCPs’) are
government employees,
providing health care services
in their official capacities.
Therefore, such HCPs in
Greece are ‘foreign officials’
as that term is defined in the
FCPA . . . .”
“Poland has a national
healthcare system. Most
Polish hospitals are owned
and operated by the
government and most Polish
HCPs [health care providers]
are government employees
providing health care services
in their official capacities.
Therefore, most HCPs in
Poland are ‘foreign officials’
as defined by the FCPA.”
“The national healthcare

123. Complaint, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Comverse Tech. Inc., No. 11-CV-1704-LDW
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/com
p21920.pdf.
124. Information, United States v. Depuy, Inc. No. 1:11-cr-000999-JDB (D.D.C. Apr. 8,
2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/depuy-inc/04-0811depuy-info.pdf; Deferred Prosecution Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Johnson &
Johnson, (Jan. 14, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/depuy-inc/04-0811depuy-dpa.pdf.
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system in Romania is almost
entirely state-run. The
healthcare system is funded
by the National Health Care
Insurance Fund (‘CNAS’), to
which employers and
employees make mandatory
contributions. Most
Romanian hospitals are
owned and operated by the
government and most
HCPs in Romania are
government employees.
Therefore, most HCPs in
Romania are ‘foreign
officials’ as defined by the
FCPA.”

Tenaris







SEC125
Same as above.
DOJ126
Employees of
OJSC O’ztashqineftgaz (“OA
O”) “a wholly owned
subsidiary of Uzbekneftegaz,
the state holding company of
Uzbekistan’s oil and gas
industry.”
Employees of
Uzbekekspertiza JSC, “an
Uzbekistani government
agency.”
SEC127
Same as above.

125. Complaint, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 1:11-cv-00686
(D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp
21922.pdf.
126. Non-Prosecution Agreement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Tenaris, S.A., (May
17, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-112-dpa.pdf.
127. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Tenaris, S.A.,
(Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-112-dpa.pdf.
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SEC128
Employees of Chinese Design
Institutes “which were
typically state-owned
enterprises that provided
design engineering and
technical integration services
that can influence contract
awards by end-user stateowned customers” and
employees of “other stateowned companies.”
DOJ129
“[P]rocurement official of the
United Nations . . . .”
SEC130
Same as above.
DOJ131
“Telecommunications
D’Haiti (‘Haiti Teleco’) was
the Republic of Haiti’s stateowned national
telecommunications
company. Haiti Teleco was
the only provider of noncellular telephone service to
and from Haiti. . . . Patrick
Joseph was the Director
General of Haiti
Teleco. . . . During his tenure
at Haiti Teleco, Patrick
Joseph was a ‘foreign official’

128. Rockwell Automation, supra note 21.
129. Non-Prosecution Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, v. Armor Holdings, Inc., (July
13,
2011),
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/armor/07-31-11armorholdings.pdf.
130. Complaint, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Armor Holdings, Inc., No. 1:11-cv01271 (D.D.C. July 13, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/c
omp22037.pdf.
131. Superseding Indictment, United States v. Washington Vasconez Cruz, No. 1:09-cr21010-JEM, 2011 WL 7655991 (S.D. Fla. July 12, 2011).
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. . . . Jean Rene Duperval was
the Director of International
Relations of Haiti Teleco. . . .
During his tenure at Haiti
Teleco, Duperval was a
‘foreign official’ . . . . Official
VJ was the Governor of the
Banque de la Republique
d’Haiti (‘“Bank of Haiti’”),
the state-owned and statecontrolled central bank of
Haiti. . . . During his tenure at
the Bank of Haiti, Official VJ
was a ‘foreign official’ . . . .”
DOJ132
“[F]oreign government
officials in Latin America and
elsewhere”
“[E]mployees of state-owned
entities . . . in Mexico and
other Latin American
countries;” employee at
Petroleos Mexicanos (“PEME
X”).
SEC133
“[V]arious government
officials in India, Thailand,
and South Korea . . . .”
“[H]undreds of Indian
government officials
responsible for purchasing or
authorizing the sale of
[Diageo’s] beverages.”
“[E]mployees of government
liquor stores in and around
New Delhi.” “[G]overnment

132. Information, United States v. Bridgestone Corp., No. 4:11-cr-00651 (S.D. Tex.
Sept. 15, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/bridgestone/
09-15-11bridgestone-information.pdf.
133. Diageo plc, Exchange Act Release No. 64978, 2011 WL 3159087 (ALJ July 27,
2011) (cease-and-desist order), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2011/3464978.pdf.
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employees of the Indian
military’s Canteen Stores
Department.”
“[G]overnment officials in the
North Region of India and in
the State of Assam for the
purpose of securing label
registrations. . . .”
“[E]xcise officials to secure
import permits and other
administrative approvals.”
A “Thai government and/or
political party
official . . . [who] served as
Deputy Secretary to the Prime
Minister, Advisor to the
Deputy Prime Minister, and
Advisor to the Ministry of
Agriculture and Cooperatives.
The Thai Official also served
on a committee of the ruling
Thai Rak Thai political party,
and as a member and/or
advisor to several state-owned
or state-controlled industrial
and utility boards.”
South Korean customs
officials, South Korean
military officials, and other
South Korean government
officials
SEC134
Employees of certain Chinese
state-owned design institutes.
DOJ135
“[G]overnment officials in

134. Watts Water Techs, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 65555, 2011 WL 4860051
(ALJ Oct. 13, 2011) (cease-and-desist order), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/ad
min/2011/34-65555.pdf.
135. Non-Prosecution Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Aon Corp., (Dec. 20, 2011),
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/aon/2011-12-20-aon-final-executednpa.pdf.
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Costa Rica . . .”
Employees of
“Instituto Nacional De
Deguros (‘INS’), Costa Rica’s
state-owned insurance
company . . . .”
SEC136
Same as above. In addition,
officials from an “Egyptian
government-owned company,
the Egyptian Armament
Authority (‘EAA’), and its
U.S. arm, the Egyptian
Procurement Office (‘EPO’)”;
“Vietnam Airlines, a
Vietnamese governmentowned entity . . . .”
“BP Migas and Pertamina,
two Indonesia state-owned
entities in the oil and gas
industry”
“Myanmar Airways (assured)
and Myanmar Insurance
(reinsured), two governmentowned entities”;
“Biman Bangladesh Airways
(assured) and Sudharan Bima
Corporation (reassured), two
government-owned
entities . . . .”
“[T]he son of a former highranking government official
in Bangladesh with several
important political
connections.”
DOJ137

136. Complaint, SEC v. Aon Corp., No. 1:11-cv-02256 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 2011).
137. Information at 4, 6-7, United States v. Magyar Telekom, Plc., No. 1:11CR00597
(E.D. Va. Dec. 29, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/ma
gyar-telekom/2011-12-29-information-magyar-telekom.pdf; see also Non-Prosecution
Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Deutsche Telekom AG, No. 1:11CR-00597 (Dec. 29,
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“Telekom Crne Gore A.D.,
n/k/a ‘Crnogorski Telekom,’
(‘TCG’) and its mobile
company subsidiary were,
respectively, the Montenegrin
state-owned fixed line and
cellular telecommunications
companies. . . . Before
MAGYAR TELEKOM
acquired TCG, it was
controlled by the Government
of Montenegro. Accordingly,
employees of TCG were
‘foreign officials’ . . . .”
“Macedonian Political Party
A and Macedonian Political
Party B were political parties
in the Macedonian governing
coalition during 2005, among
other times. Each party
represented a traditional ethic
group in Macedonia. As
such, Macedonian Political
Party A and Macedonian
Political Party B were each a
‘foreign political party’. . . .”
“Macedonian Official #1 was
a high-ranking government
official with responsibility
related to telecommunications
laws and regulations . . . and a
leader of Macedonian
Political Party A. As such,
Macedonian Official #1 was a
‘foreign official’ and an
official of a foreign political
party . . . .”
“Macedonian Official #2 was
a high-ranking government

2011),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/deutschetelekom/2011-12-29-deustche-telekom-npa.pdf.
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official with responsibility for
telecommunications laws and
regulations . . . and a leader of
Macedonian Political Party B.
As such, Macedonian Official
#2 was a ‘foreign official’ and
an official of a foreign
political party . . . .”


SEC138
Same as above.

The year 2011 witnessed three judicial challenges to the enforcement
theory that employees of alleged SOEs are “foreign officials” under the
FCPA. These challenges relied in part on my declaration that was filed in
February 2011 in connection with the below-described Carson enforcement
action.139 The Carson “foreign official” challenge was the first in the
138. See Complaint, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Magyar Telekom, Plc, No. 11 CIV 9646
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp
22213-co.pdf.
139. Koehler’s Carson Declaration, supra note 90, at 4, 6-7. In sum, the declaration
states as follows:
There is no express statement or information in the FCPA’s legislative history
describing the ‘any department, agency, or instrumentality’ portion of the
‘foreign official’ definition. Further, there is no express statement or
information in the FCPA’s legislative history to support the DOJ’s expansive
legal interpretation that alleged SOEs are ‘instrumentalities’ (or ‘departments’
or ‘agencies’) of a foreign government and that employees of SOEs are
therefore ‘foreign officials’ under the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.
However, there are several statements, events, and information in the FCPA’s
legislative history that demonstrate that Congress did not intend the ‘foreign
official’ definition to include employees of SOEs.
Id.
Among other things,
During its multi-year investigation of foreign corporate payments that preceded
enactment of the FCPA, Congress was aware of the existence of SOEs and that
some of the questionable payments uncovered or disclosed may have involved
such entities. . . . [I]n certain of the competing bills introduced in Congress to
address foreign corporate payments, the definition of ‘foreign government’
expressly included SOEs,” and Congress was provided a more precise definition
of “foreign government” to include SOEs.
Id. It further states that:
However, despite being aware of SOEs, despite exhibiting a capability for
drafting a definition that expressly included SOEs in other bills, and despite
being provided a more precise way to describe SOEs, Congress chose not to
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FCPA’s history that made use of a detailed and complete overview of the
FCPA’s extensive legislative history on the “foreign official” element.140

include such definitions or concepts in . . . the bill that ultimately became the
FCPA . . . .
Id. The declaration was also relied upon in the Lindsey Manufacturing and O’Shea “foreign
official” challenges discussed infra note 140 and 144.
140. Prior to the Carson “foreign official” challenge, there were two previous “foreign
official” challenges. The first “foreign official” challenge in the FCPA’s history is believed
to be in the Nguyen enforcement action brought in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in
2009. See Motion to Dismiss Superseding Indictment for Failure to State a Criminal
Offense and for Vagueness at *2-4, United States v. Nguyen, No. 2:08-cr-00522-TJS, 2009
WL 3847470, (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 2009) (explaining the grounds for Defendants’ “foreign
official” challenge to the government’s FCPA enforcement action). This challenge did not
make extensive use of the FCPA’s detailed legislative history relevant to the “foreign
official” issue. In December 2009, U.S. District Court Judge Timothy Savage denied,
without any analysis, the motion to dismiss in a one-paragraph order. Order Denying
Motion to Dismiss for Mootness, United States v. Nguyen, No. 2:08-cr-00522-TJS (E.D. Pa.
Dec. 3, 2009). The second “foreign official” challenge in the FCPA’s history is believed to
be the Joel Esquenazi enforcement action brought in the Southern District of Florida.
Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Failure to State a Criminal Offense and for Vagueness,
United States v. Esquenazi, No. 1:09-cr-21010-JEM (S.D. Fla. Nov. 2, 2010). The motion
likewise did not contain a thorough analysis of the FCPA’s extensive legislative history on
the “‘foreign official” element and was part of a series of motions filed to dismiss the
indictment, some of which were inflammatory and appeared to lack even facial merit, such
as selective and vindictive prosecution, that alleged racism by the government. U.S. District
Court Judge Jose Martinez denied the “foreign official” challenge in a cursory opinion
devoid of substantive analysis, delivered approximately forty-eight hours after the DOJ’s
response brief. Order Denying Without Prejudice Motion in Limine as to Joel Esquenazi,
No. 1:09-cr-21010-JEM (S.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 2010). The substance of the opinion was as
follows:
The Court . . . finds that the Government has sufficiently alleged that Antoine
and Duperval were foreign officials by alleging that these individuals were
directors in the state-owned Haiti Teleco. Any factual arguments Defendant has
on this point may be addressed at trial. . . . The Court also disagrees that Haiti
Teleco cannot be an instrumentality under the FCPA’s definition of foreign
official. The plain language of this statute and the plain meaning of this term
show that as the facts are alleged in the indictment Haiti Teleco could be an
instrumentality of the Haitian government.
Order Denying Defendant Joel Esquenazi’s (Corrected and Amended) Motion to Dismiss
Indictment for Failure to State a Criminal Offense and for Vagueness at 2-3, United States
v. Esquenazi, No. 1:09-cr-21010-JEM (S.D. Fla. 2010), ECF No. 309 (internal citations
omitted). In August 2011, Esquenazi and co-defendant Carlos Rodriguez were found guilty
of, among other things, FCPA offenses after a jury trial. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Two Telecommunications Executives Convicted by Miami Jury on All Counts for
Their Involvement in Scheme to Bribe Officials at State-Owned Telecommunications
Company in Haiti (Aug. 5, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/August/
11-crm-1020.html. Defendants are appealing their conviction to the Eleventh Circuit and
this appeal will be the first time in the FCPA’s history that the definition of “foreign
official” will be squarely before a Circuit Court. See infra note 151 (explaining grounds on

092726E6-C225-41CF-9832-AC0ECA330BFDKOEHLER_FCPA_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

FCPA UNDER THE MICROSCOPE

1/23/2013 1:51 PM

43

Although the Carson “foreign official” challenge was filed before the
below-described Lindsey Manufacturing “foreign official” challenge, the
briefing schedule in the latter case resulted in an earlier judicial decision.
In April 2011, Judge Howard Matz (C.D. Cal.) held in an enforcement
action involving Lindsey Manufacturing and its CEO and CFO (Keith
Lindsey and Steven Lee) that “a state-owned corporation having the
attributes of CFE (Comisión Federal de Electricidad, a Mexican utility)
may be an ‘instrumentality’ of a foreign government within the meaning of
the FCPA, and officers of such a state-owned corporation . . . may therefore
be “foreign officials” within the meaning of the FCPA.”141
Judge Matz identified the following “non-exclusive list” of “various
characteristics of government agencies and departments that fall within
[the] description [of instrumentality]”:
[T]he entity provides a service to the citizens—indeed, in many
cases to all the inhabitants—of the jurisdiction; [t]he key officers
and directors of the entity are, or are appointed by, government
officials; [t]he entity is financed, at least in large measure,
through governmental appropriations or through revenues
obtained as a result of government-mandated taxes, licenses, fees
or royalties, such as entrance fees to a national park; [t]he entity
is vested with and exercises exclusive or controlling power to
administer its designated functions; [and t]he entity is widely
perceived and understood to be performing official (i.e.,
governmental) functions.142
As to the FCPA’s legislative history Judge Matz stated in dicta as
follows:
The [C]ourt finds that the legislative history of the FCPA is
inconclusive. Although it does not demonstrate that Congress
intended to include all state-owned corporations within the ambit
of the FCPA, neither does it provide support for Defendants’
insistence that Congress intended to exclude all such corporations
from the ambit of the FCPA.143
In early January 2012, Judge Lynn Hughes from the Southern District
of Texas denied, without issuing a written decision, John Joseph O’Shea’s
“foreign official” challenge in a case involving the same CFE entity at
issue in the Lindsey enforcement action.144
which defendants’ base their pending appeal).
141. Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 2-3, United States v. Noriega,
No. 2:10-cr-01031-AHM (C.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2011), ECF No. 474.
142. Id. at 9.
143. Id. at 14.
144. Mike Koehler, Friday Roundup, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 6, 2012),
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In May 2011, Judge James Selna in the Central District of California
concluded in an enforcement action involving various former employees of
Controlled Components Inc. (the “Carson” enforcement action) that “the
question of whether state-owned companies qualify as instrumentalities
under the FCPA is a question of fact . . . [and that] [s]everal factors bear on
the question of whether a business entity constitutes a government
instrumentality . . . .”145
According to Judge Selna, those factors include the following:
The foreign state’s characterization of the entity and its
employees; the foreign state’s degree of control over the entity;
the purpose of the entity’s activities; the entity’s obligations and
privileges under the foreign state’s law, including whether the
entity exercises exclusive or controlling power to administer its
designated functions; the circumstances surrounding the entity’s
creation; and the foreign state’s extent of ownership of the entity,
including the level of financial support by the state (e.g.,
subsidies, special tax treatment, and loans).146
Judge Selna stated that the above “factors are not exclusive, and no
single factor is dispositive.”147 Rather, Judge Selna said that the “chief
utility [of the factors] is simply to point out that several types of evidence
are relevant when determining whether a state-owned company constitutes
an ‘instrumentality’ under the FCPA—with state ownership being only one
of several considerations.”148
Despite these factors, Judge Selna also stated as follows:
[M]ere monetary investment in a business entity by the
government may not be sufficient to transform that entity into a
governmental instrumentality. But when a monetary investment
is combined with additional factors that objectively indicate the
entity is being used as an instrument to carry out governmental
objectives, that business would qualify as a governmental

http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-21. However, on January 16, 2012, at trial
after the close of the DOJ’s case, Judge Hughes granted O’Shea’s motion for acquittal and
found him not guilty of all substantive FCPA charges. See Mike Koehler, O’Shea Not
Guilty of Substantive FCPA Charges, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 17, 2012),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/oshea-not-guilty-of-substantive-fcpa-charges (explaining the
district court’s reasoning behind granting Defendant’s Motion for Acquittal on all
substantive FCPA charges).
145. Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 5, United States v. Carson, No.
8:09-cr-00077-JVS (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2011), ECF No. 373.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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instrumentality.149
As to the FCPA’s legislative history, Judge Selna found “that the
statutory language of the FCPA is clear, that the statutory scheme is
coherent and consistent, and that resort to the legislative history of the
FCPA is unnecessary.”150
Far from adding certainty to the “foreign official” element of an FCPA
anti-bribery violation, the trial court decisions in 2011 created more
confusion and uncertainty concerning a key element of an important law
governing international business transactions. In the minds of some, the
“foreign official” challenges are over and the DOJ has prevailed, even if
the trial court rulings have not completely endorsed various aspects of the
DOJ’s position. Yet, none of these decisions have precedential value and
an important issue to monitor in 2012 is the Esquenazi/Rodriguez appeal to
the Eleventh Circuit.151 This appeal will be the first time in the FCPA’s
history that “foreign official” will be squarely before a Circuit Court.
ii.

Knowledge

The year 2011 also witnessed a rare appellate court FCPA decision in
arguably the most complex and convoluted case in the FCPA’s history.
The case involves Frederic Bourke, who was a member of an investment
consortium, and was criminally charged in 2005 along with others for
making:
a series of corrupt promises, payments, and offers of payments to
senior officials of the Government of Azerbaijan in order to
enable the investment consortium . . . to purchase vouchers and
options and to bid at auction for interests in SOCAR
[Azerbaijan’s national oil company] and other valuable Azeri
State assets.152
The case took several twists and turns as the FCPA substantive charges

149. Id. at 7.
150. Id. at 11–12.
151. See Mike Koehler, Rodriguez Seeks Release Pending Historic Appeal, FCPA
PROFESSOR (Jan. 3, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/rodriguez-seeks-release-pendinghistoric-appeal (explaining the grounds on which defendants base their pending appeal).
152. Indictment at 10, United States v. Kozeny, 493 F. Supp. 2d 693 (No. 1:05-cr00518-SAS) (S.D.N.Y. June, 21 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/f
cpa/cases/kozenyv/05-12-05kozeny-indict.pdf; see also Andrew Longstreth, Azerbaijan
Bribes Put One Mogul on Trial, Another in Exile, AM. LAW., Oct. 9, 2009,
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/international/LawArticleIntl.jsp?id=1202434399273&Azerbaij
an_Bribes_Put_One_Mogul_on_Trial_Another_in_Exile&slreturn=20120928222426
(providing additional background on the case).

KOEHLER__FCPA_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

46

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

1/23/2013 1:51 PM

[Vol. 15:1

were originally dismissed on statute of limitations grounds,153 the
substantive charges were later reinstated,154 and a superseding indictment
was then filed in 2009 dropping the FCPA substantive charges.155
Following a six-week jury trial before U.S. District Court Judge Shira
Scheindlin (S.D.N.Y.) in 2009, Bourke was found guilty of conspiracy to
violate the FCPA and the Travel Act, and making false statements to the
FBI.156 Bespeaking the complex nature of the case, in November 2009,
Judge Scheindlin rejected the DOJ’s ten year sentencing recommendation
and instead sentenced Bourke to 366 days in prison.157 In doing so, Judge
Scheindlin stated: “After years of supervising this case, it is still not
entirely clear to me whether Mr. Bourke was a victim, or a crook, or a little
bit of both.”158
Bourke’s appeal largely focused on whether he had sufficient
knowledge of the bribery scheme, challenging the trial court’s conscious
avoidance jury instruction and other knowledge issues such as whether he
acted “corruptly” and “willfully” and whether the trial court erred in failing
to give a good faith jury instruction.159
In December 2011, the Second Circuit affirmed Bourke’s conviction.
Its decision on conscious avoidance is noteworthy in terms of FCPA
jurisprudence.160 The court concluded that Bourke enabled himself to
participate in a bribery scheme without acquiring actual knowledge of the
specific conduct at issue and that there was ample evidence to support a
conviction on a conscious avoidance theory.161 Among other things, the
153. See United States v. Kozeny, 493 F. Supp. 2d 693, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(dismissing substantive FCPA charges).
154. See id. at 714-15 (reinstating the claims against Bourke on the government’s
Motion for Reconsideration).
155. See Indictment, United States v. Bourke, No. 1:05-cr-00518-SAS (S.D.N.Y. May
26, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/kozenyv/05-2609bourke2nd-supersed-indict.pdf.
156. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Connecticut Investor Found Guilty in
Massive Scheme to Bribe Senior Government Officials in the Republic of Azerbaijan (July
10, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/July/09-crm-677.html.
157. See Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 28, United States v. Bourke, No. 1:05-cr00518-SAS (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2009), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Kozeny, 667 F.3d
122 (2d Cir. 2011), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/kozenyv/11-1009bourke-trans-hearing.pdf (providing the court’s reasoning behind rejection of the DOJ’s
recommendation, in favor of a lesser sentence).
158. Id. at 34.
159. See Mike Koehler, Outlining Bourke’s Appeal, FCPA PROFESSOR (Aug. 11, 2010),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/outlining-bourkes-appeal (reviewing Bourke’s direct appeal
to the Second Circuit and parallel Rule 33 motion to the Southern District of New York).
160. See United States v. Kozeny, 667 F.3d 122, 140 (2d Cir. 2011).
161. See id. at 133 (explaining the evidence used by the court to support a conviction on
a conscious avoidance theory).
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Second Circuit noted that Bourke “was aware of how pervasive corruption
was in Azerbaijan generally,” that he knew of his co-defendants’ shady
reputation, that he created advisory companies “to shield himself and other
American investors from potential liability from payments made in
violation of [the] FCPA,” and that he otherwise “avoided learning whether
corrupt payments were made.”162
As to whether conscious avoidance can be supported primarily by
circumstantial evidence, the Second Circuit stated as follows:
It is not uncommon for a finding of conscious avoidance to be
supported primarily by circumstantial evidence. Indeed, the very
nature of conscious avoidance makes it unlikely that the record
will contain directly incriminating statements. Just as it is rare to
find direct record evidence of an employer stating, “I am not
going to give you a raise because you are a woman,” it is highly
unlikely a defendant will provide direct record evidence of
conscious avoidance by saying, “Stop! I think you are about to
discuss a crime and I want to be able to deny I know anything
about it!”163
The message to international investors from the Second Circuit’s
Bourke decision should be clear—if a potential investment results in
sleepless nights and fear of asking specific, direct questions because of the
answers that might be received, there is probably a better use for the
money. Moreover, the Second Circuit’s Bourke decision is likely to further
motivate current enforcement agency scrutiny of the relationship between
financial firms and sovereign wealth funds as well as private equity
investments in emerging markets.164
iii. DOJ Conduct
Following Judge Matz’s denial of the above-mentioned “foreign
official” challenge in the Lindsey Manufacturing enforcement action, the
defendants proceeded to trial and in May 2011, Lindsey Manufacturing,
Keith Lindsey, and Steven Lee were found guilty of various FCPA charges
after a five week jury trial.165 The DOJ called the verdict an “important
162. Id.
163. Id. at 134.
164. See, e.g., Dionne Searcey & Randall Smith, SEC Probes Banks, Buyout Shops
Dealing With Sovereign Wealth Funds, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2011, at C1 (detailing the
SEC’s probe into whether banks and private equity firms violated the FCPA in their
dealings with sovereign wealth funds).
165. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, California Company, Its Two Executives and
Intermediary Convicted by Federal Jury in Los Angeles on All Counts for Their
Involvement in Scheme to Bribe Officials at State-Owned Electrical Utility in Mexico
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milestone” in its FCPA enforcement efforts as Lindsey Manufacturing was
the first company ever to be tried and convicted of FCPA offenses.166
The milestone was short-lived, however, as Judge Matz, after months
of legal wrangling, vacated the convictions and dismissed the indictment
after finding numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct.167 In the
words of Judge Matz, the instances of misconduct were so varied and
occurred over such a long time period “that they add up to an unusual and
extreme picture of a prosecution gone badly awry.”168 Judge Matz
specifically cited the following missteps:
[T]he Government team allowed a key FBI agent to testify
untruthfully before the grand jury, inserted material falsehoods
into affidavits submitted to magistrate judges in support of
applications for search warrants and seizure warrants, improperly
reviewed e-mail communications between one Defendant and her
lawyer, recklessly failed to comply with its discovery obligations,
posed questions to certain witnesses in violation of the Court’s
rulings, engaged in questionable behavior during closing
argument and even made misrepresentations to the Court.169
Prosecutorial misconduct findings logically focus on specific actions
by specific actors, and one reading of Judge Matz’s decision is that it will
have little impact on future FCPA enforcement. Yet another plausible read
is that Judge Matz’s decision was based, in part, on the quality of the
DOJ’s case in the first instance. For example, in addition to criticizing the
DOJ’s willful blindness instruction and other aspects of the DOJ’s trial
positions, Judge Matz, in setting forth reasons why the DOJ’s conduct
prejudiced the defendants, noted the “weakness” of the DOJ’s case and
how it was “far from compelling.”170 He stated as follows:
Dr. Lindsey and Mr. Lee were put through a severe ordeal.
Charges were filed against them as a result of a sloppy,
incomplete and notably over-zealous investigation, an
investigation that was so flawed that the Government’s lawyers
tried to prevent inquiry into it. In some instances motives,
statements and conduct were attributed to them that were wholly
unfounded or were obtained unlawfully . . . . The financial costs

(May 10, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/May/11-crm-596.html.
166. Id.
167. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, United States v. Aguilar Noriega, 831 F. Supp.
2d 1180, 1210 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (No. 2:10-cr-01031-AHM).
168. Id. at 1185.
169. Id. at 1182.
170. Id. at 1207. Post-trial motions as to sufficiency of the evidence and based on
various FCPA elements were pending, but were rendered moot by Judge Matz’s decision.
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of the investigation and trial were immense, but the emotional
drubbing [that Lindsey and Lee] absorbed undoubtedly was even
worse. As for [Lindsey Manufacturing], the very survival of that
small, once highly-respected enterprise has been placed in
jeopardy.171
Whatever impact Judge Matz’s decision may have on FCPA
enforcement in the future, this much is clear—the DOJ’s record in
corporate FCPA trials stands at 0-2.172
iv. Africa Sting Rulings
In 2011, the DOJ’s manufactured Africa Sting case, in which FBI
agents posed as procurement officials representing the President of
Gabon,173 was also subjected to intense scrutiny and the results of that
scrutiny were not positive for the DOJ.
Given the number of individuals charged, the defendants were
separated into four groups for trial and the first Africa Sting trial was held

171. Id. at 1209.
172. See Mike Koehler, One Win, One Loss, FCPA PROFESSOR (May 16, 2011),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/one-win-one-loss (summarizing the FCPA trial of Harris
Corporation and its management). In 1990, Harris Corporation (“Harris”) and its
executives, John Iacobucci and Ronald Schultz, were criminally charged in connection with
business conduct in Colombia. Specifically, the defendants were charged with making
payments to influence officials to award government telecommunications contracts to Harris
in violation of the FCPA. Harris, Iacobucci, and Schultz put the DOJ to its burden of proof
and the criminal trial began in March 1991. At the close of the DOJ’s case, Judge Charles
Legge (N.D. Cal.) granted the defendants’ motion for acquittal, concluding that no
reasonable jury could convict the company or its executives of the charged counts.
173. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Twenty-Two Executives and Employees of
Military and Law Enforcement Products Companies Charged in Foreign Bribery Scheme
(Jan. 19, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/January/10-crm-048.html. The twentytwo individuals charged worked in the military and law enforcement products industry and
the DOJ employed undercover law enforcement tactics, with the assistance of an individual
who previously plead guilty to unrelated FCPA offenses, in charging the defendants. Per
the DOJ’s own admission, the “scheme was part of [an] undercover operation, with no
actual involvement from any minister of defense.” See generally Mike Koehler, Africa
Sting – The Charges, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 20, 2010), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/afric
a-sting-the-charges (summarizing the indictments of the individuals implicated in the Africa
Sting and their ensnarement by the FBI); see also Mike Koehler, Africa Sting – “Individual
1” Identified . . . and Charged . . . In a Different Case, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 23, 2010),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/africa-sting-individual-1-identified-and-charged-in-adifferent-case (discussing FBI cooperator Richard Bistrong’s indictment in a bribe scheme
wholly separate from the Africa Sting); Del Quentin Wilber, Off-Color Communiques Taint
FBI Sting in Court, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2012, at A01 (describing indecent text messages
between federal law enforcement agents and an informant, and defense attorneys’
exploitation of the impropriety of the communications).
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during the summer of 2011. In the first trial, Judge Richard Leon (D.D.C.)
ordered, in a decision from the bench, what is believed to be the first-ever
judicial ruling on the jurisdictional reach of the 78dd-3 prong of the
FCPA.174 This prong was added to the FCPA by the 1998 amendments and
applies to “persons other than issuers or domestic concerns” and provides
the following jurisdictional requirement: “while in the territory” of the
U.S. the person corruptly made use of the mails or any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce in furtherance of a bribery
scheme.175 When listing reasons why FCPA enforcement has increased
during the past decade, the 78dd-3 prong of the FCPA’s anti-bribery
provisions is surely on the list as several recent enforcement actions have
been based on increasingly aggressive enforcement theories that have been
ripe for judicial scrutiny for many years.176
During the first Africa Sting trial, Judge Leon granted defendant
Pankesh Patel’s (a U.K. citizen) Rule 29 acquittal motion at the end of the
DOJ’s case as to an FCPA substantive charge premised on his sending a
DHL package—containing a purchase agreement in furtherance of the
alleged corrupt scheme— from the U.K. to the U.S.177 Calling the DOJ’s
jurisdictional theory “novel” and noting that there was no case law to
support it, Judge Leon dismissed the charge against Patel, as well as certain
174. See Mike Koehler, Significant dd-3 Development in Africa Sting Case, FCPA
PROFESSOR (June 9, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/significant-dd-3-development-inafrica-sting-case (quoting extensively from hearing transcript in which a skeptical Judge
Leon questioned whether each act has to occur “while in the territory of the United States”).
175. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3 (2006).
176. See, e.g., Information, United States v. DaimlerChrysler Auto. Russia SAO, No.
1:10-cr-00064-RJL (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fr
aud/fcpa/cases/daimler/03-22-10daimlerrussia-info.pdf (alleging that Daimler’s whollyowned German-based subsidiary made improper payments to Russian government officials,
that passed through the United States via interstate wires and sham companies established in
the United States); Information, United States v. Daimler Export and Trade Finance GmbH,
No.
1:10-cr-00065-RJL
(D.D.C.
Mar.
22,
2010),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/daimler/03-22-10daimlerexp-info.pdf
(alleging that Daimler’s wholly-owned German-based subsidiary made improper payments
to Croatian government officials that passed through sham companies incorporated in the
United States); Information, United States v. DaimlerChrysler China Ltd., No. 1:10-cr00066-RJL
(D.D.C.
Mar.
22,
2010),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/daimler/03-22-10daimlerchina-info.pdf
(alleging that Daimler’s wholly-owned Beijing-based subsidiary made improper payments
to Chinese government officials that passed through the United States); Information, United
States v. SSI Int’l Far East, Ltd., No. 3:06-cr-00398-KI (D. Or. Aug. 22, 2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/ssi-intl/10-10-06ssi-information.pdf
(alleging that SSI’s wholly-owned South Korean-based subsidiary made improper payments
to Chinese and Korean government officials that were authorized by U.S. officers at SSI).
177. Transcript of Trial, United States v. Goncalves, No. 1:09-cr-00335-RJL (D.D.C.
June 6, 2011).
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other charges against the other defendants.178
The DOJ’s jurisdictional defeat turned out to be just the beginning of
its struggles in the Africa Sting case. In July 2011, Judge Leon declared a
mistrial as to all remaining counts against Patel, Andrew Bigelow, John
Benson Wier, and Lee Allen Tolleson after the jury was unable to reach a
verdict.179 However, the DOJ’s difficulties did not stop with the first Africa
Sting case. In the manufactured case’s second trial, Judge Leon dismissed,
among other charges, the DOJ’s conspiracy charge against all defendants
(John Mushriqui, Jeana Mushriqui, Patrick Caldwell, Stephen Giordanella,
John Godsey, and Mark Morales) finding that the DOJ failed to produce
“sufficient evidence to enable a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that each of [the] six defendants participated in the
overarching conspiracy charged . . . .”180 Because the conspiracy charge
was the only charge against Giordanella, he was exonerated as a result of
Judge Leon’s ruling.181 Additional Africa Sting trials are scheduled in 2012
and how the DOJ fares in those trials will be a significant story in 2012.
v.

Victims of Bribery

If bribery is not a victimless crime, as many including the DOJ
frequently state,182 then why do FCPA fines and penalties go directly into
the U.S. Treasury with no apparent effort to identify and compensate the
victims of FCPA violations? A judicial challenge in 2011 raised this
interesting and legitimate issue.
In May 2011, Instituto Constarricense de Electricidad of Costa Rica
(“ICE”) petitioned for victim status of Alcatel-Lucent’s wide-ranging
bribery scheme.183
The petition followed the December 2010

178. Id.
179. See Mike Koehler, First Africa Sting Trial Results in Mistrial, FCPA PROFESSOR
(July 8, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/first-africa-sting-trial-results-in-mistrial
(noting the implications of a hung jury for the merits of the DOJ’s case).
180. Transcript of Trial at 5, United States v. Goncalves, No. 1:09-cr-00335-RJL
(D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2011).
181. Id. at 9.
182. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, California Company, Its Two
Executives and Intermediary Convicted by Federal Jury in Los Angeles on All Counts for
Their Involvement in Scheme to Bribe Officials at State-Owned Electrical Utility in Mexico
(May 10, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/May/11-crm-596.html (“Bribery is not
a victimless crime . . . .”); see also Alexandra Wrage, Paying the Fox to Buy New Chickens,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 15, 2011, 2:37 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alexandrawrage/paying-the-fox-to-buy-new_b_647837.html (stating that “[c]ompensating the victims
of corruption is a hot new topic” and that “[r]estitution to victims is hard not to like” but
noting that the DOJ “does not attempt to compensate victims of bribery”).
183. Petition for Relief Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) and Objection to Plea
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announcement that Alcatel-Lucent and certain subsidiaries agreed to
resolve a wide-ranging FCPA enforcement action, including conduct in
Costa Rica involving payments to ICE officials.184 Even though ICE
acknowledged that “three disloyal and corrupt [ICE] Directors and two
disloyal and corrupt employees” were the recipients of Alcatel Lucent’s
bribe payments, it nevertheless claimed it was a victim because the corrupt
activities of Alcatel-Lucent caused the company “massive losses” and
“catastrophic harm.”185 ICE argued that it was universally recognized that
a victim includes an entity whose employees accept improper benefits to
affect corporate decisions and that it was “nonsense” for an entity to be
considered an active participant in a bribery scheme just because five of its
16,500 employees were implicated.186 In opposition, the DOJ argued that
given the “profound and pervasive corruption at the highest levels of ICE,
the government does not believe it is appropriate to consider ICE a victim,”
and that “it does not follow that the state-owned entity at which corruption
was so pervasive in the tender process should now be permitted status as a
victim or awarded restitution . . . .”187
ICE’s petition was factually difficult from the start and it is not
surprising that ICE did not prevail at the trial court level or in its writ of
mandamus to the Eleventh Circuit.188 Yet, ICE’s petition did succeed in
Agreement and Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Alcatel-Lucent S.A., No.
1:10-cr-20907-MGC (S.D. Fla. dismissed May 31, 2011).
184. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Alcatel-Lucent S.A. and Three Subsidiaries
Agree to Pay $92 Million to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation (Dec. 27,
2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/December/10-crm-1481.html. The DOJ alleged
that ICE was a “wholly state-owned telecommunications authority in Costa Rica responsible
for awarding and administering public tenders for telecommunications contracts” and that
ICE officers, directors, and employees were thus “foreign officials” under the FCPA.
Information ¶ 13, United States v. Alcatel-Lucent S.A., No. 1:10-cr-20907-MGC (S.D. Fla.
Dec. 27, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/alcateletal/12-27-10alcatel-et-al-info.pdf.
185. Petition for Relief Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) and Objection to Plea
Agreement and Deferred Prosecution Agreement at ¶ 12, United States v. Alcatel-Lucent
S.A., No. 1:10-cr-20907-MGC (S.D. Fla. May 31, 2011).
186. Victim Instituto Constrarricense de Electricidad’s Memorandum of Law In Support
of Petition for Relief Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) and Objection to Plea Agreement
and Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 1, United States v. Alcatel-Lucent S.A., No. 1:10cr-20907-MGC (S.D. Fla. May 31, 2011).
187. Government’s Response to ICE’s Petition for Victim Status and Restitution at 3, 4,
United States v. Alcatel-Lucent S.A., No. 1:10-cr-20906-MGC (S.D. Fla. May 23, 2011).
188. See Order Denying Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida at 2, In re Instituto Constarricense de Electricidad,
No. 1:10-cr-20906-MGC (S.D. Fla. June 17, 2011) (holding that the “district court did not
clearly err in finding that [ICE] . . . actually functioned as the offenders’ coconspirator” and
that the district court did not “err in finding that ICE failed to establish that it was directly
and proximately harmed by the offenders’ criminal conduct”).

092726E6-C225-41CF-9832-AC0ECA330BFDKOEHLER_FCPA_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

FCPA UNDER THE MICROSCOPE

1/23/2013 1:51 PM

53

raising victim issues in FCPA enforcement actions and caused those
interested in bribery and corruption issues to ponder the valid and
legitimate questions of victims a bit more closely.
vi. Travel Act
The FCPA is not the only tool the DOJ has used to charge alleged
foreign bribery schemes. After all, application of the FCPA requires a
“foreign official” and not all foreign bribery schemes involve a “foreign
official.”
With increasing frequency, the DOJ charges—often in
conjunction with FCPA offenses—Travel Act violations when the conduct
at issue lacks a “foreign official,” yet concerns allegations of foreign
commercial bribery.
Enacted in 1961 prior to the FCPA, the Travel Act is part of the
racketeering chapter of the U.S. criminal code and prohibits interstate and
foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises. 189
Specifically, the Travel Act prohibits travel in interstate or foreign
commerce or use of the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign
commerce with intent to, among other things, carry on “any unlawful
activity” which is defined to include bribery in violation of state law.190
Approximately thirty states have laws that “generally prohibit giving
anything of value to an individual for the purpose of influencing the
individual’s conduct in work-related matters without the consent of the
recipient’s employer or in breach of a duty.”191
California is one such state with a law prohibiting commercial
bribery,192 and in the Carson enforcement action described above in
connection with the “foreign official” challenges, the DOJ—in addition to
FCPA charges based on alleged payments to employees of various SOEs—
also charged Travel Act violations based on allegations of payments to
employees of private companies in China and Russia.193

189. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2006).
190. Id.
191. John Rupp & David Fink, Foreign Commercial Bribery and the Long Reach of
U.S. Law, 6 BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS-CORPORATE AND M&A LAW 3, Jan. 11, 2012, at 1,
available
at
http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/6f93a9ee-340d-49b3-83fe252d3ddc8ced/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/5af5fff4-f264-42f2-aace2781d6869cd9/Foreign_Commercial_Bribery_and_the_Long_Reach_of_U.S._Law.pdf.
192. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 641.3 (Deering 2012) (providing that “any employee who
solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept money . . . is guilty of commercial bribery”).
193. See, e.g., Indictment, United States v. Carson, No. SACR09-0077, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 154145 (Apr. 8, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/
cases/carsons/04-08-09carson-indict.pdf (alleging additional charges based on payments to
employees of private companies in China and Russia).
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In June 2011, certain Carson defendants moved to dismiss the Travel
Act charges.194 Defendants’ principal arguments were the following: (i)
“In Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. [. . .] the Supreme Court
explained that unless Congress has clearly indicated that a statute applies
extraterritorially, it does not” and that Travel Act application to the foreign
bribery alleged in [the] case violate[d] Morrison’s presumption against the
extraterritoriality of U.S. law; and (ii) “[t]he government’s recent
application of th[e] fifty-year old statute against foreign commercial
bribery, in the face of strong skepticism that it even applies, shows the
enforcement of this statute is arbitrary.”195 As to this later issue, defendants
argued that “[c]onsideration of the Travel Act in conjunction with the
subsequently enacted FCPA also demonstrates that Congress did not intend
that the Travel Act extend to foreign bribery.”196
The DOJ’s principal arguments in opposition were the following: (i)
“[b]ecause the majority of defendants’ unlawful conduct was based in the
United States, the statutes at issue [the Travel Act and California’s
commercial bribery statute] reach defendants’ conduct without resort to
extraterritorial application” since all of the defendants were U.S. citizens,
served as executives at the company’s California headquarters, and that a
“significant portion of the four defendants’ acts in furtherance of the
conspiracy occurred either in the United States or through communications
with individuals in the United States”; and (ii) “[a]lthough the Court need
not consider the question of whether the Travel Act applies
extraterritorially, the plain language of the statute, the legislative history,
and the case law all indicate that the Travel Act does apply
extraterritorially.”197
In August 2011, in a case of first impression, Judge Selna denied
defendants’ motion to dismiss.198 In sum, Judge Selna concluded that: (i)
“an extraterritorial analysis is unnecessary under Morrison because the
criminal offense was completed domestically”; and (ii) “even if an
extraterritorial analysis is implicated, the Travel Act counts are
proper . . . .”199 As to the later issue, an issue of broader significance, Judge
194. Defendants’ Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Counts One, Eleven, Twelve
and Fourteen of the Indictment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof,
United States v. Carson, No. 8:09-cr-00077-JVS (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2011).
195. Id. at 1-2.
196. Id. at 2.
197. Government’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts One, Eleven,
Twelve and Fourteen of the Indictment, Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 1, 3,
United States v. Carson, No. 8:09-cr-00077-JVS (C.D. Cal. July 18, 2011).
198. Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts 1, 11, 12 and 14 of the
Indictment, United States v. Carson, No. 8:09-cr-00077-JVS (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011).
199. Id. at 5.
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Selna concluded that the “plain language of the Travel Act demonstrates
Congress’s desire to reach conduct overseas.”200 As to defendants’
argument that subsequent enactment of the FCPA provided an inference
that the Travel Act was not intended to apply extraterritorially, Judge Selna
observed that “multiple criminal statutes can often be applied to the same
criminal conduct” and he did “not discern any conflict between the Travel
Act and the FCPA.”201
As commentators have noted, with the recent passage of the U.K.
Bribery Act, a law that contains FCPA-like provisions as well as
provisions, unlike the FCPA, prohibiting commercial bribery, increased
attention will be paid to foreign commercial bribery and the Carson Travel
Act decision may motivate the DOJ in the future to bring purely
commercial foreign bribery cases.202
From a litigation standpoint, FCPA followers had much to keep track
of in 2011 and the past year was a refreshing change from most previous
years during which the enforcement agencies’ conduct and prosecution
theories were seldom the subject of meaningful judicial scrutiny. While it
is tempting to score 2011 losses and victories (and to be sure, the DOJ had
several victories in 2011, including jury trial verdicts against Joel
Esquenazi and Carlos Rodriguez along with the record-setting sentence of
Esquenazi),203 the past year demonstrates that subjecting FCPA
enforcement actions to greater judicial scrutiny is in the public interest and
that more corporate and individual FCPA defendants, despite motivating
factors to the contrary,204 could benefit from mounting legal defenses and
holding the enforcement agencies to its high burdens of proof in FCPA
enforcement actions.

200. Id. at 9.
201. Id. at 11 n.9.
202. See Rupp & Fink, supra note 191, at 1 (“To be sure, foreign commercial bribery is
not yet a primary focus of U.S. enforcement activity. . . . But a move by U.S. authorities to
target commercial bribery robustly is . . . a distinct possibility.”).
203. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Executive Sentenced to 15 Years in Prison for
Scheme to Briber Officials at State-Owned Telecommunications Company in Haiti (Oct. 25,
2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/October/11-crm-1407.html; Press Release, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Two Telecommunications Executives Convicted by Miami Jury on All
Counts for Their Involvement in Scheme to Bribe Officials at State-Owned
Telecommunications Company in Haiti (Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/
August/11-crm-1020.html.
204. See Façade, supra note 1, at 923-27 (describing the dynamics which result in little
or no judicial scrutiny of most FCPA enforcement actions).
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C. Other Scrutiny
FCPA scrutiny in 2011 was not limited to Congress and the judiciary.
As FCPA enforcement has increased, and as enforcement theories have
become more aggressive, the FCPA has rightly attracted interest from a
variety of sources including academics, the press and public interest
groups.
In July 2011, the FCPA made headlines around the world in
connection with the News Corporation (“News Corp.”) scandal—
specifically, allegations that News Corp. employees and agents provided
cash or other things of value to London police officers to obtain non-public
information that better allowed News Corp. entities to publish stories and
thus sell more newspapers.205 Media coverage of News Corp.’s potential
FCPA exposure shined a much needed light on the FCPA’s current era and
raised two distinct, yet related, questions: (i) whether, given the
enforcement agencies’ current enforcement theories, the London police
officer payments could expose News Corp. to FCPA liability; and (ii)
whether Congress intended the FCPA to apply to the numerous FCPA
enforcement actions in this new era that have nothing to do with obtaining
or retaining foreign government contracts.
The answer to the first question is a clear yes, as several FCPA
enforcement actions have been based on payments to customs officials, tax
officials, immigration officials and the like where the payments have
nothing to do with “obtaining or retaining business” with a foreign
government, but rather, the payments were alleged to have assisted the
payor in “obtaining or retaining” business in the general sense.206
The answer to the second question is subject to much debate. The
FCPA’s original definition of “foreign official” excluded “any employee of
a foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof
whose duties are essentially ministerial or clerical.”207 This was the
FCPA’s original (albeit indirect) facilitating payment exception. The
relevant House Report states in pertinent part as follows:
[A] gratuity paid to a customs official to speed the processing of
a customs document would not be reached by the bill. Nor would
it reach payments made to secure permits, licenses, or the
205. See, e.g., Dominic Rushe & Jill Treanor, James Murdoch Could Face Criminal
Charges on Both Sides of the Atlantic, THE GUARDIAN, July 8, 2011,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/jul/08/james-murdoch-criminal-charges-phonehacking (reporting on News Corp.'s legal scrutiny in both the U.K. and U.S.).
206. See Façade, supra note 1, at 972-97 (discussing recent FCPA enforcement actions
involving foreign licenses, permits, applications, certifications, and customs and tax duties).
207. Koehler’s Carson Declaration, supra note 90, at 90.
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expeditious performance of similar duties of an essentially
ministerial or clerical nature which must . . . be performed in any
event.208
When Congress amended the FCPA in 1988, among other things, the
definition of foreign official was amended by removing this indirect
facilitating payment exception from the “foreign official” definition by
creating a stand-alone facilitating payment exception currently found in the
statute.209 In converting the FCPA’s de facto facilitating payment
exception to an express facilitating payment exception, Congress did not
seek to disturb its original intent. The relevant House Report states as
follows:
The policy adopted by Congress in 1977 remains valid, in terms
of both U.S. law enforcement and foreign relations
considerations. Any prohibition under U.S. law against this type
of petty corruption would be exceedingly difficult to enforce, not
only by U.S. prosecutors but by company officials themselves.
Thus while such payments should not be condoned, they may
appropriately be excluded from the reach of the FCPA. U.S.
enforcement resources should be devoted to activities that have
much greater impact on foreign policy.210
Many who commented on News Corp.’s potential FCPA exposure
raised valid and legitimate concerns that the enforcement agencies have
been “applying the law ever more broadly—to conduct that has little
connection to obtaining government contracts or other government
benefits, such as product approvals, permits or licenses”211 and that the
enforcement agencies “have been attempting to extend their enforcement to
include any payments that have nothing to do with foreign government
procurement.”212
Yet, the issue of whether current FCPA enforcement theories align
with congressional intent in enacting the FCPA could be asked on a wide
variety of issues.213 Such questions have long been asked by those who
208. H.R. Rep. No. 95-640, at 8 (1977).
209. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b) (2006) (providing an exception for payments intended to
expedite or ensure routine governmental action).
210. H.R. REP. NO. 100-40, pt. 2, at 76-77 (1987).
211. David Rivkin Jr. & Lee Casey, Payments and News-Gathering: The New First
Amendment Threat, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2011, at A19.
212. Editorial, News and Its Critics, WALL ST. J., July 18, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/a
rticle/SB10001424052702303661904576451812776293184.html?mod=djkeyword.
213. See, e.g., Façade, supra note 1 (discussing whether many current FCPA
enforcement theories align with congressional intent); see also Koehler’s Carson
Declaration, supra note 90, at 90 (providing an overview of legislative history relevant to
the FCPA's “foreign official” element).
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devote their professional careers to the FCPA, but the News Corp. scandal,
and its potential FCPA scrutiny, succeeded like no other episode in the
FCPA’s history in focusing broad attention to this new era of FCPA
enforcement. As News Corp.’s potential FCPA exposure and other similar
examples also make clear, as the FCPA nears its thirty-fifth anniversary,
the statute seems to be used with increasing frequency by the enforcement
agencies to address corporate ethics in general.214
If an all-purpose corporate ethics statute is indeed the policy goal that
the United States seeks to advance through FCPA enforcement, such a
decision is best left to Congress to effectuate through a change in the
statute, not for the enforcement agencies to effectuate through corporate
charging decisions that are largely insulated from judicial scrutiny.215
The current aggressive FCPA enforcement environment and calls for
FCPA reform also prompted several bar organizations and civil society
organizations to publicly weigh in on the issues. In October 2011, a
proposed resolution supported by the current and incoming chairs of the
American Bar Association’s (“ABA”) Criminal Justice Section was
presented to ABA Section Council Members.216 By its terms, the draft
resolution calls for targeted FCPA reform in an effort to increase the
statute’s transparency and fairness and to remove specific areas of textual
ambiguity.217 For instance, the draft resolution calls on Congress to
provide a definition for the term “instrumentality [of a foreign
government],” to consider a UK Bribery Act-style compliance defense to
protect companies against the difficult-to-control acts of rogue

214. For instance, the Tyson Foods FCPA enforcement action involved Mexican
veterinarians lawfully employed at the company’s Mexican plant who were responsible for
certifying product for export. Non-business payments were allegedly made to the
veterinarians. However, the charging documents do not give any detail as to how the
payments sought to influence the veterinarians nor do the charging documents suggest that
the product at issue was not qualified for export. In fact, Tyson’s press release (a release the
DOJ had to approve per the deferred prosecution agreement) states that there were no issues
with the safety of the exported product. See Mike Koehler, Tyson Foods Settle FCPA
Enforcement Action Involving Mexican Veterinarians and Their No-Show Wives, FCPA
PROFESSOR (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/tyson-foods-settles-fcpaenforcement-action-involving-mexican-veterinarians-and-their-no-show-wives (questioning
whether the FCPA’s “obtain or retain business” element still has significance).
215. See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2886 (2010) (stating
that the court’s function is to give a statute “the effect its language suggests, however
modest that may be; not to extend it to admirable purposes it might be used to achieve”).
216. See Mike Koehler, ABA Ponders FCPA Reform, FCPA PROFESSOR (Nov. 8, 2011),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/aba-ponders-fcpa-reform (reporting on the presentation of an
ABA Resolution to reform the FCPA).
217. Resolution, American Bar Association, Criminal Justice Section, Report to the
House of Delegates (on file with author).
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employees/transaction partners, and to limit criminal liability based on
theories of successor liability.218 Although the draft resolution applauds the
work done by DOJ and the SEC to ensure that anti-corruption laws are
taken seriously and to lead the global push for greater anti-corruption
compliance, it warns of the danger that because of the FCPA’s loose
drafting, it lends itself to being transformed from a criminal proscription
carrying moral condemnation to a public welfare offense less likely to deter
future misconduct.219
However, the mere discussion of FCPA reform was opposed by many
civil society organizations in 2011. Viewing FCPA reform from a
simplistic either-you-are-against-bribery-or-for-bribery position, civil
society groups have suggested that “for the U.S. to roll back any of its
ground-breaking anti-bribery law at this critical juncture when the rest of
the world is finally starting to match its standards, would be an abdication
of its leadership role on this important issue.”220
In September 2011, the George Soros-funded Open Society
Foundations released a white paper titled Busting Bribery: Sustaining the
Global Momentum of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“Busting
Bribery”).221 Positioned as a response to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s
October 2010 white paper titled Restoring Balance: Proposed Amendments
to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,222 Busting Bribery asserted that the
218. Id. at 3-5.
219. See id. at 4 (describing how ABA proposal is “based on the basic criminal law
principle that there should be no liability for a company that did not act in concert with the
bad actor, and that, therefore, possessed no ‘guilty mind’”).
220. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 80 (2011)
(written testimony of Global Witness).
221. DAVID KENNEDY & DAN DANIELSEN, OPEN SOC’Y FOUNDS, BUSTING BRIBERY:
SUSTAINING THE GLOBAL MOMENTUM OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 39 (2011),
available at http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/Busting%2520Brib
ery2011September.pdf. George Soros is the chairman of Soros Fund Management LLC.
Busting Bribery asserts that corporations that resolve FCPA enforcement actions have a
“bad or wrongful purpose,” that current standards “simply do not permit successful
prosecution of innocent, mistaken or unknowing persons” and that companies involved in an
FCPA enforcement action are corrupt. Id. at 39 (internal quotation omitted). While
misguided, if the Soros-funded Open Society Foundations believes in such statements, it is
interesting to note that Soros Fund Management LLC invests in numerous FCPA violators
or companies subject to FCPA scrutiny. See Mike Koehler, Why Does George Soros Invest
in So Many FCPA Violators?, FCPA PROFESSOR (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor
.com/why-does-george-soros-invest-in-so-many-fcpa-violators (commenting on Soros Fund
Management LLC’s recent 13F filing, which documented investments in companies under
FCPA scrutiny).
222. ANDREW WEISSMANN & ALIXANDRA SMITH, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, RESTORING BALANCE: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 7 (2010), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.
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“FCPA is working as Congress intended and new legislation is neither
necessary nor advisable.”223 Among other things, Busting Bribery stated
that FCPA reform would “set back decades of progress in the global
struggle against corruption” and that “FCPA prosecutorial overreach by the
Department of Justice (DOJ) is a myth.”224
Yet Busting Bribery exhibited a poor understanding of how the FCPA
is actually enforced, an inaccurate view of the FCPA’s legislative history,
and glaring omissions as to basic corporate criminal liability principles.225
For instance, Busting Bribery asserted, in opposing an FCPA compliance
defense, that such a defense “makes no sense when, as under the current
FCPA, corporate criminal liability requires proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that the company acted with actual knowledge and corrupt intent to
influence a foreign government to gain an improper business advantage.”226
While it is true that the corrupt intent element must be met in order to
convict a company of an FCPA offense, that corrupt intent element can be
satisfied, and often is, by singular and isolated acts of any employee, even
if the employee’s conduct is contrary to preexisting compliance policies
and procedures.227
com/sites/default/files/restoringbalance_fcpa.pdf.
Specifically, the Chamber’s FCPA
proposals are as follows: “adding a compliance defense; limiting a company’s liability for
the prior actions of a company it has acquired; adding a ‘willfulness’ requirement for
corporate criminal liability; limiting a company’s liability for acts of a subsidiary; and
defining a ‘foreign official’ under the statute.” See also Mike Koehler, Revisiting a Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 609 (2012) (discussing
FCPA compliance defense).
223. KENNEDY & DANIELSEN, supra note 221, at 8.
224. KENNEDY & DANIELSEN, supra note 221, at 5-6.
225. See Mike Koehler, Off-Target, FCPA PROFESSOR (Oct. 17, 2011),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/off-target (discussing the shortcomings of the Busting
Bribery report).
226. KENNEDY & DANIELSEN, supra note 221, at 6.
227. For instance, the only time in the FCPA’s history that a corporate FCPA charge
was presented to a jury was in the Lindsey Manufacturing case in 2011. The relevant jury
instruction stated as follows:
To sustain the charge of conspiracy to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(‘“FCPA’”) or violation of the FCPA against Lindsey Manufacturing Company,
the government must prove the following propositions: First, the offense
charged was committed by one or more agents or employees of Lindsey
Manufacturing Company; Second, in committing the offense, the agent or
employee intended, at least in part, to benefit Lindsey Manufacturing Company;
and Third, the acts by the agent or employee were committed within the
authority or scope of his employment. For an act to be within the authority of an
agent or the scope of the employment of an employee, it must deal with a matter
whose performance is generally entrusted to the agent or employee by Lindsey
Manufacturing Company. It is not necessary that the particular act was itself
authorized or directed by Lindsey Manufacturing Company. If an agent or an
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What is most striking about many of the opposition pieces written
about FCPA reform is that while opponents of FCPA reform warn of a U.S.
retreat on bribery and corruption issues should the FCPA be amended,
opponents fail to address the fact that an amended FCPA, or revisions to
FCPA enforcement policy, would actually align the FCPA with the many
FCPA-like laws or enforcement policies of peer nations.228 For instance,
one FCPA reform proposal is to amend the FCPA to include a compliance
defense under which a company’s preexisting compliance policies and
procedures, and its good faith efforts to comply with the FCPA, would be
relevant as a matter of law when a non-executive employee or agent acts
contrary to those policies and procedures and in violation of the FCPA.229
Many OECD Convention countries that provide for some form of corporate
criminal liability in their domestic law (and not all do) have compliancelike defenses in their domestic FCPA-like law.230 In addition, the United
States is believed to be the only OECD Convention country that uses NPAs
or DPAs to resolve instances of alleged corporate bribery.
That the United States enforces the FCPA out-of-step, in many ways,
with its OECD Convention peer countries was the focus of a December
2011 white paper released by the International Business Transactions
Committee of the Bar Association of New York City titled The FCPA and
Its Impact on International Business Transactions—Should Anything Be
Done to Minimize the Consequences of the U.S.’s Unique Position on
Combating Offshore Corruption (the “New York Bar Report”).231 The
employee was acting within the authority or scope of his employment, Lindsey
Manufacturing Company is not relieved of its responsibility because the act was
illegal.
Jury Instructions at 17, United States v. Aguilar Noriega, 831 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (C.D. Cal.
May 6, 2011) (No. 2:10-cr-01031-AHM).
228. The United States is not the only country with a law prohibiting bribery of foreign
officials for a business purpose. Thirty-seven other countries (collectively representing twothirds of the world’s exports and ninety percent of foreign direct investment) have also
adopted, like the United States, the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions (“OECD Convention”). Country
Reports on the Implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/document/24/0,3746,en_2649_37447_1933144_1_1_1_37447,00.html
(last visited Dec. 4, 2012).
229. See Koehler, supra note 222, at 611 (arguing that an FCPA compliance defense
should be incorporated into the FCPA).
230. See Koehler, supra note 222, at 638-44 (documenting the compliance-like defenses
available in other OECD member countries).
231. NEW YORK CITY BAR ASS’N, THE FCPA AND ITS IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS—SHOULD ANYTHING BE DONE TO MINIMIZE THE CONSEQUENCES
OF THE U.S.’S UNIQUE POSITION ON COMBATING OFFSHORE CORRUPTION? 3 (2011), available
at http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/FCPAImpactonInternationalBusinessTransact
ions.pdf.
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New York Bar Report analyzes the FCPA and FCPA enforcement, in part,
from an economic perspective and explains:
There are three elements to the current approach to FCPA
enforcement that are helpful in understanding the costs, risks and
other constraints that the FCPA places on U.S.-regulated
companies vis-à-vis their non-U.S. regulated competitors: (1) the
U.S. enforcement agencies’ expansive reading of the scope of the
FCPA (both in terms of conduct and jurisdiction), (2) the limited
checks on FCPA enforcement (whether judicial or otherwise) and
(3) the massive size of the potential direct costs (e.g., fines,
sanctions and defense and compliance costs) and indirect costs
(e.g., reputational effects and “debarment” from current or future
government business) of avoiding or defending an actual or
threatened enforcement action.232
Noting the rise in FCPA enforcement and the “asymmetric approach
to enforcement” between the U.S. and other OECD Convention countries,
the New York Bar Report concluded as follows:
(1) the United States has pursued, and is currently pursuing, a
virtually
stand-alone
approach
to
deterring
foreign
corruption, . . . (2) this approach places significant costs on
companies that are subject to the FCPA as compared to their
competitors that are not, . . . and, (3) if these circumstances are
unlikely to change, . . . the United States should reevaluate its
approach to the problem of foreign corruption.233
The report stated, among other things, that the “continued unilateral
and zealous enforcement of the FCPA by the United States may not be the
most effective means to combat corruption globally—in fact, in some
circumstances it may exacerbate the problem of overseas corruption.”234
CONCLUSION
The New York Bar Report concluded as follows: “While the task is
daunting and the discomfort of admitting that the current approach has
significant flaws is unavoidable, that does not mean that action should not
be taken.”235 This is a fitting end as well to this Article, which analyzed
notable enforcement trends from the past year and chronicled the most
intense year of public scrutiny in the FCPA’s history. These trends and this
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id. at 3, 15.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 25.
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scrutiny demonstrate that as the FCPA’s thirty-fifth year approaches, basic
legal and policy questions remain as to the purpose, scope and
effectiveness of the FCPA.

